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Abstract 
	  
ABRAMS, ARIANA   Government Policy and Moral Hazard in the 2007-2009 
Financial Crisis. Departments of Economics and Political Science. 
	  
ADVISORS: Eshragh Motahar (Economics) and Mark Dallas (Political Science) 
	  
	  
	  
The US government has invested over $3 trillion in financial assistance programs and 
bailouts for ailing companies affected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This paper analyzes the 
different government policy efforts in response to the collapse of the U.S. financial sector and 
whether these efforts increased the risk of moral hazard for small, medium, and large banks. 
Moral hazard occurs when a company has an incentive to take greater risks than it 
	  
otherwise would, because the company gains all the benefits from excessive risk-taking, but does 
not bear all of the losses. I measure moral hazard through the debt-to-equity ratio, interest rate 
spreads, and risk ratings on new loan originations for a select group of small, medium, and large 
banks. This paper is different from previous studies because I analyze the issues of public 
transparency, accountability and policy clarity during and after the financial crisis. This analysis 
is done in the context of the dynamic relationship between democratically elected government 
bodies of Congress and the Presidency and politically appointed bodies of the Federal Reserve 
and the U.S. Treasury. 
The results indicate that government policies preceding and during the financial crisis 
increased the risk of moral hazard on the part of large banks, but not for medium and small 
banks. In addition, the failure of government policy to establish a clear plan of action further 
exacerbated the issue of moral hazard. This suggests that ‘too-big-to-fail’ remains a systemic 
risk to the financial sector despite efforts to attenuate it. 
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Chapter One 
	  
	  
Introduction 
	  
	  
	  
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 marked the largest financial meltdown of the United States 
economy since the Great Depression. The level of financial instability required the Federal 
Reserve, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and Congress to provide an unprecedented bailout 
effort with extended lending facilities and asset purchases to prevent the drop of firms’ security 
prices (D’Apice and Ferri 2010, 129).  Critics of the government bailouts claim that additional 
assistance through Federal credit and public tax dollars increases the likelihood of moral hazard 
by allowing institutions to take greater risks. This paper analyzes the different policies of the 
Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, Congress and the Presidency in response to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis and whether these efforts increased the risk of moral hazard for small, medium 
and large banks. 
	  
Moral hazard is measured through the debt-to-equity ratio, interest rate spreads, and risk 
ratings on new loan originations for small, medium, and large banks. In addition to Federal 
lending facilities, this paper analyzes Congress’ passage of TARP, which put American taxpayer 
dollars at risk of moral hazard. Given the greater degree of public transparency and 
accountability, one would expect democratically elected government bodies, rather than 
politically appointed bodies to be more sensitive to public opinion and enact legislation that 
reduces moral hazard. 
The financial crisis began and persisted because brokers, investors, and regulators were 
focused on the short-term, microeconomic outlook of their actions, rather than the greater long- 
term macroeconomic picture. The greater understanding that we have of the macroeconomic 
2	  	  
instances of moral hazard, the better we can prevent another systemic collapse of the US 
	  
economy. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
1.1 Moral Hazard 
	  
Moral hazard generally occurs after a debt contract has been signed and a borrower 
engages in higher risk activities that can jeopardize loan repayment (D’Apice and Ferri 2010, 
26).  The borrower has an incentive to take excessive risks, with the possibility of larger profits 
and the safety net that the lender will incur some of the losses. In the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
the financial sector’s preceding uncontrolled growth into riskier investments, resulted in a severe 
economic downturn for major financial firms on Wall Street (Dowd, 2009). When a bank that 
poses a systemic risk, faces liquidity and other financial issues, the Federal Reserve, as the lender 
of last resort can facilitate additional lending to prevent the firm’s failure. However, the Federal 
Reserve’s additional lending facilities and bailouts of systemically important financial 
institutions can also create the implicit financial market (hereby referred to as the market) 
expectation that large banks can receive future bailouts. Therefore, past government bailouts can 
increase the future risk of moral hazard by incentivizing systemically important banks to take 
excessive investment risks. 
Before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the most recent concern over government bailouts 
and moral hazard occurred in 1984 with the Federal Reserve’s $9.5 billion bailout of Continental 
Illinois National Bank and Trust Company (Wright 2010, 39).  The Fed’s bailout sent a wave of 
opposition that the government’s actions would set the precedent for bank risk taking and the 
future risk of moral hazard. The argument follows the claim that large financial firms have an 
3	  	  
incentive to take greater risks, because of the implicit guarantee that the government would 
provide additional lending facilities to bail them out. 
Moral hazard became an issue in the 2007-2009 financial crisis when commercial and 
investment banks, as well as insurance and mortgage corporations required government financial 
assistance in order to sustain liquidity1. In August 2007, the Federal Reserve began an 
unprecedented amount of government funding through a variety of lending facilities. But by 
September 2008, the Fed had exhausted its financial ability to fund depository and investment 
banks and in an act of desperation, the U.S. Treasury requested additional funding from Congress.  
This created a unique situation in U.S. history, whereby the insurers were U.S. taxpayers, and 
private companies had the opportunity to profit off of public funds. 
	  
	  
	  
1.2 Deregulation and Innovation: The Rise 
	  
The seed for a financial crisis was planted when former-President Bill Clinton repealed the 
Glass-Steagall Act (1933) with the passage of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (1999) (Hendershott 
and Villani, 2012).  Originally implemented after the Great Depression, Glass-Steagall (1933) 
separated the actions of commercial and investment banks. Commercial banks could accept 
deposits and provide loans, while investment banks could sell and guarantee securities. Former- 
Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) was one of eight Senate members to vote against the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall (1933), stating his concerns before the Senate floor that: 
	  
“I worry very much that the fusing together of the idea of banking, which requires not just safety 
and soundness to be successful, but the perception of safety and soundness…to merge it with 
inherently risky speculative activity, is in my judgment unwise. I think we will in 10 years’ time 
look back and say, we should not have done that.” 
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ability for a firm to meet its short-term debt obligations (Acharya and Viswanathan 2010) 
2 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought mortgages from banks, thrifts and mortgage companies resold these 
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The repeal of Glass-Steagall (1933) provided investment and commercial banks with increased 
profit opportunities, but also the ability to engage in greater investment risk. The deregulation of 
the investment and commercial banks was compounded with the influx of the mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) market that allowed easier access to credit for potential-homeowners. America 
has always been the land of opportunity, and with the rise in available credit throughout the early 
2000s, an individual’s ‘dream home’ could now become a reality. Unfortunately, the rise in 
homeownership rates did not come without a serious cost to the United States and world 
economy. 
The rise in home ownership rates was created in part by the taxpayer-backed government 
sponsored enterprises (GSE), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The giant mortgage companies 
received special incentives from the government with lower interest rate payments and support 
through business cycles. With the confidence of government backing, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were two main companies loaning mortgage-backed securities (MBS)2. The value of 
securities that were backed by mortgage loans rose as the housing bubble inflated to record 
proportions (D’Apice and Ferri, 2010). 
In addition to the rise of the mortgage-backed securities, new securitized financial 
instruments became widespread through the rise of the Originate-to-Distribute (OTD) business 
model depicted in Figure 1.1 on the following page. The figure illustrates the complex OTD 
process of reselling of an illiquid asset, such as a mortgage (i.e., prime, alt-A, or subprime loan), 
to a broker at an investment bank or other financial institution. The broker quickly sells the loan 
to a third party issuer that breaks up the illiquid asset into different tranches that can be sold as a 
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought mortgages from banks, thrifts and mortgage companies resold these 
mortgages through securitization, creating mortgage-backed securities. Securitization allowed firms to repacked 
traditional loans into securities to sell to investors, thereby transferring the higher-risk onto a third-party. 
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security to investors3. While inherently riskier, securitization allowed commercial and 
investment banks to earn greater profits during economic booms. Under the OTD model, banks 
rationalized riskier investments, because assets were spread between numerous parties. 
	  
	  
	  
Figure 1.1. Originate-to-Distribute Business Model 
	  
 
	  
Source: Ito, 2011. Based on a chart that originally appeared in the Bank of Japan, Financial Stability Report, March, 
2008 
	  
	  
	  
Another important factor underlying the rise of bank balance sheets was the rise of the 
shadow banking system. Shadow banks are mostly investment banks, but also other financial 
intermediaries that provide credit facilities, but do not fall under the regulatory oversight of the 
Federal Reserve (Pozsar et. al, 2009). Examples of shadow banks include traditional hedge 
funds, structured investment vehicles (SIVs), money market mutual funds, and government 
sponsored entities. Shadow banks trade complex financial instruments like bond swaps, interest 
rate swaps, and credit default swaps and highly liquid assets like commercial paper and the repo 
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Discussed further in Chapter Three, Section 3.6 
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market. Commercial banks are subject to Federal Reserve capital requirements to protect against 
excessive leverage. Banks were able to hedge some of their investment risks onto third-party 
balance sheets of shadow banks that were not subject to regulations. In effect, banks were able to 
take larger risks and did not have to provide capital requirements that were equivalent to their 
higher amount of leverage. Therefore, the shadow banking system increased the risk-taking in 
financial markets. 
Despite the dramatic rise in housing prices and clear signs of a housing bubble the Federal 
Reserve, nor any other governmental body took the initiative to declare a systemic risk was at 
stake and growing. 
	  
	  
	  
1.3 The Great Fall 
	  
The combination of loose regulatory standards from mortgage lenders, credit rating`s 
agencies, and new financial instruments, provided the ingredients for one of the worst financial 
meltdowns to date. Financial innovation converted mortgages into securities, sold them 
nationally and internationally, and allowed for the distribution of risk between banks and 
investors. Subprime lenders who were subject to adjustable rate mortgages were severely 
impacted when mortgages interest rates increased dramatically (D’Apice and Ferri, 2010).  The 
OTD-model provided incentives for brokers to sell as many securitized mortgages because the 
securities were ‘diversified’ between a number of agents and investors. However, when a 
homeowner defaulted on his/her mortgage, the diversified nature of securitized investment 
products also created a systemic breakdown of the numerous parties involved in securitized 
assets. Therefore, the collapse of the housing bubble also increased serious instability in the 
financial sector. 
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The first signs of financial distress became apparent on August 9, 2007 when the asset- 
backed commercial paper (ABCP) market was unable to rollover their outstanding volumes 
(D’Apice and Ferri 2010, 123).  By November 2007 the losses from the collapse of the housing 
market became so severe that banks began performing write-downs4. In order to prevent 
deflation due to a loss in bank assets, the Federal Reserve began a number of lending facilities 
beginning with the Term Auction Facility (TAF) for commercial banks. However, investment 
banks also required lending facilities, which led to the creation of the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) to provide $200 billion worth of government bonds.  Despite TSLF lending, 
investment banks required further funding, and the Fed created the Primary Credit Dealer 
Facility (PCDF) to extend the discount window to investment banks. The extension of Federal 
	  
Reserve lending facilities and discount rate illustrated the serious liquidity issues taking place. 
	  
The first major government bailout occurred on March 16, 2008, when the Federal Reserve 
facilitated JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition to buy Bear Sterns. Bear Sterns was highly leveraged 
in the CDO market and in dire need of liquidity when the mortgage market collapsed in 2007 
(Friedman, 2011).  While the Federal Reserve attempted to stabilize investment banks, the nations 
two largest government sponsored entities (GSE), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were 
also running into financial woes. On July 13, 2008 the U.S. Treasury purchased shares of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, in order to prevent mortgage corporations’ collapse. But Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s share price continued to fall and on September 7th, 2008, the Federal Reserve and 
U.S. Treasury made the decision to nationalize the mortgage firms. 
Presumably, just as the government had taken action for Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and 
	  
Freddie Mac, the financial sector expected that the Federal Reserve would continue to provide 
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A write down is an accounting technique to reduce the book-value of an asset because it is 
overvalued in comparison to the market-value of an asset. 
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financial support to major financial companies. However, on September 15, 2008 the failure of 
	  
Lehman Brothers proved that the government would provide no such thing for every ailing firm-- 
	  
-no matter the size. By allowing Lehman Brothers to fail, a sea of panic swept over the market 
with investors unsure and unconfident of the financial stability in the US, the securities market 
responded by posting one of the largest downturns (Friedman, 2011).  Questions arose: What 
firm would be the next to fail? Would the government even provide a rescue package? 
The systemic risk that one financial institution’s failure places on the entire financial sector 
required the Federal Reserve, the US Department of the Treasury, and Congress to take action 
and provide a comprehensive plan to prevent the entire collapse of the US economy. This thesis 
will analyze the extent to which government increased the risk of moral hazard ex ante, during, 
and ex post the 2007-2009 financial crisis for small, medium, and large banks. 
The next chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature on government policy and 
the increased risk of moral hazard. The third chapter quantifies moral hazard through the degree 
of debt-to-equity, interest rate spreads and risk of new loan originations for small, medium and 
large banks. Chapter four examines and compares the policies implemented by democratically 
elected government bodies, versus politically appointed government bodies. Chapter five 
concludes the study and discusses the limitations and possible policy implications. 
9	  	  
Chapter Two 
	  
	  
Literature Review of Financial Sector Moral Hazard 
	  
	  
This section provides an overview and review of previous literature and the extent to which 
government policy increases the risk of moral hazard in the financial sector. Subsection 2.1 will 
outline Federal Reserve monetary policies and the impact on firm risk-taking prior to and during 
the financial crisis. Subsection 2.2 discusses the impact of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) headed by the U.S. Treasury. Subsection 2.3 will compare the public interest in 
democratically elected bodies of Congress and the Presidency versus politically appointed bodies 
of the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. 
	  
	  
	  
2.1 The Federal Reserve and Moral Hazard 
	  
Federal Reserve Policy 
	  
The role of the Federal Reserve has expanded tremendously since its inception. As the 
original lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve is responsible for the nation’s monetary policy, 
regulating the banking sector’s reserve requirements and capital ratios, and maintaining overall 
financial stability (Johnson and Kwak, 2010).  A number of scholars examine the role of the 
Federal Reserve in the recent financial crisis and the extent to which it contributed to moral 
hazard (Dowd 2009; D’Apice and Ferri, 2010; Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Wright, 2010; Farhi 
and Tirole, 2012). 
Safety nets provided by government policies can potentially increase the risk of moral 
hazard. The former-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan and current Chairman, 
Ben Bernanke, continually pursued an expansionary monetary by purchasing Treasury bonds, 
thereby, increasing the nation’s money supply and creating a lower Federal Funds rate. The 
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Federal Reserve received a wide-range of criticism for the low interest rate or ‘loose monetary 
policy’ that it pursued in recent years. D’Apice and Ferri (2010) argue that during a financial 
crisis, interest rates generally rise in order to compensate for the increased level of riskiness of 
lending during a financial crisis. However, after the collapse of the housing bubble and the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the Fed continued an expansionary 
monetary policy. 
Wright (2010) claims that a low interest rate creates moral hazard by encouraging 
investment in riskier assets and signaling to investors and institutions that the Federal Reserve 
will come to their aid if they run into financial woes. Johnson and Kwak (2010) add that a low 
Federal funds rate and the existence of the Federal Reserve’s insurance through the discount rate 
(i.e., lower interest rates) and short-term liquidity loans increases the risk of moral hazard. 
Johnson and Kwak (2010) explain that market knowledge of government safety nets provides 
banks with the incentive to raise their risk-taking, in order to increase shareholder returns. Farhi 
and Tirole (2012) claim that the Fed’s low interest rate policy is subject to time inconsistency and 
encourages banks to take greater risks by issuing more short term liabilities. The time 
inconsistency model claims that policies that were optimal for past situations are not always 
optimal for current issues; thereby stating that low interest rates prior to a financial crisis are not 
necessarily ideal to continue during a financial crisis. In essence, the loose monetary policy 
pursued by the Federal Reserve through the Federal Funds rate creates an incentive for investors 
to take higher risks and increases the likelihood of moral hazard. This paper will analyze the 
changes in monetary policy and the resulting effect on bank risk taking. 
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Excessive Leverage 
	  
As stated earlier, moral hazard occurs when a company has an incentive to take greater 
risks, because the company will gain all of the benefits, but will not necessarily incur all of the 
losses. The debt-to-equity ratio is a measure of a company’s total debt, divided by total equity. 
Banks are able to earn greater profits for their shareholders by leveraging their equity through 
debt, in the form of loans to consumers and businesses (United States Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, 2011).  Therefore, the debt-to-equity ratio is one measure of a bank’s level of 
leverage and overall risk. 
The rise in credit lending created an issue of excessive leverage on the part of many 
commercial and investment banks as well as insurance and mortgage corporations. Pomfret 
(2010) claims that easier access to credit created a higher degree of leverage and excessive risk 
taking as a common feature among financial crises since the 1970s.  Johnson and Kwak (2010) 
point out that securitization, credit default swaps and flexible capital requirements made it 
possible for banks to increase their leverage power because the ratings for many of these 
instruments did not accurately reflect investment risk. In addition, Farhi and Tirole (2012) point 
out that government policy was narrowly focused on the solvency of individual institutions, 
rather than a larger macroeconomic approach on the overall transformation of banks that posed a 
systemic risk. This ad hoc approach did not help to contain the excessive leverage that financial 
institutions were running on.   In effect, bailing out major financial firms that created the initial 
financial crisis in 2007 only increased the future risk of moral hazard. 
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2.2 The U.S. Department of the Treasury and Moral Hazard 
	  
U.S. Treasury Policy 
	  
In addition to the extended lending facilities provided by the Federal Reserve, Congress 
authorized the use of $700 billion taxpayer dollars to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to 
stabilize the economy. The historic Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created under 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) and signed into law on October 3, 2008 
(Hazelwood and Black 2012).  The goal of TARP was to restore liquidity and confidence in the 
financial sector through the government purchase of troubled assets (i.e., mortgage backed 
securities and asset-backed securities) on banks’ balance sheets (United States Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission 2011). 
While TARP was established on the basis of stability for the financial sector, critics of 
TARP claim that the legislation increased the risk of moral hazard. Wright (2010) argues that 
large banks dubbed as ‘too big to fail’ take greater risks in order to gain record profits and 
therefore create the issue of moral hazard. Wright (2010) outlines the role that Congress must 
play when the Federal Reserve runs out of resources to capitalize ailing banks. Wright (2010) 
claims that the tools that the government uses to deal with the financial crisis focus on the 
symptoms of moral hazard, but do not target the actual causes of excessive leverage on the parts 
of borrowers and lenders. 
Ghosh and Mohamed (2010) focus on the underpinnings of the TARP program with the 
plan for the federal government to buy up to $700 billion of illiquid mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) to help lending in the mortgage market. However, 
Ghosh and Mohamed (2010) point out that five weeks after the program’s enactment the 
Treasury turned from directly buying toxic assets, to instead purchasing non-voting preferred 
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stock. In effect, TARP tax dollars no longer benefited taxpayers by reviving lending to 
homeowners or mitigating foreclosures, but rather supported the transfer of taxpayer wealth to 
the financial institutions. The authors claim that TARP’s original goal was to channel more 
credit into the banking system, but instead became a rescue package for failing banks and 
automobile companies. This paper will explore the goal of TARP and the reason for the 
legislation’s transition. 
This paper is most similar to Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) analysis that examines TARP 
and non-TARP small, medium, and large banks risk ratings of new loan originations in the 
commercial and industrial lending (C&I) from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending 
(STBL). The STBL gather data on new loan originations from bank holding companies and 
assesses new loan origination risk. Risk-takings are based on a 1-5 scaled from the loans relative 
credit risk, default risk, equity risk, value-at-risk, return on assets, balance sheet measures of 
bank risk, and supervisory ratings. Black and Hazelwood (2012) use a difference-in-difference 
approach and control for interest, commitment, maturity, the log of loan size, and whether the 
loan was secured or floating. The results reveal that after TARP capital injections, all banks 
decreased their level of lending. However, the overall risk rating of new loan originations for 
large TARP banks increased after TARP capital injections. Black and Hazelwood (2012) claim 
that increased risk-taking in the absence of increased lending of TARP funds is indicative of 
moral hazard. My analysis builds upon Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) findings to determine 
bank risk-taking prior to the financial crisis. 
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2.3 Democratically Elected versus Politically Appointed 
	  
This paper will also analyze the political underpinnings of the government assistance 
programs implemented during and after the financial crisis. It will compare the roles and relative 
pubic interest held between democratically elected politicians versus politically appointed 
leaders. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Congress and the Presidency 
	  
The two houses in Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate, are comprised 
of democratically elected representatives. Legislative actions are subject to a higher degree of 
pubic transparency and accountability. Therefore, Congressional approval of TARP received a 
large degree of public attention and concern that the legislation protected taxpayer dollars and 
mitigated the risk of moral hazard. 
Numerous scholars critiqued the legislative process and the effect that it has in 
implementing legislation. TARP was enacted on October 3rd, 2008, but Ghosh and Mohammed 
(2010) point out that Congress did not lay out official stipulations on the use of taxpayer funds 
until the end of 2008.  The lag in policy implementation allowed for TARP funds to be accessed 
by automobile companies, like GM and Chrysler. Bayazitova and Shiydasani (2012) also shed 
light on the disorganized legislative process, where policymakers’ added important rules for 
executive compensation restrictions with the use of taxpayer dollars months after original 
legislative passage. This provides insight on the degree to which the public interest was 
considered in policymaking and effectively mitigating the risk of moral hazard. 
In addition to the ambiguity in legislative policies, the overarching goal of TARP was not 
clear. The United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) asserted that the goal for 
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the TARP program was to restore liquidity and confidence in the financial market through the 
government purchase of troubled assets on banks’ balance sheets.  However, TARP transitioned 
from purchasing troubled assets to the purchase of non-voting preferred shares. Pomfret (2010) 
claims that TARP was created to allow banks to reduce their leverage without decreasing the size 
of their loans to lenders, and thus maintaining the flow of consumer credit. But as Ito (2011) 
points out, the original purpose of TARP was designed poorly, because the direct purchase of 
‘troubled assets’ would only work if a financial institution failed. Conversely, financial 
institutions were bailed out and therefore, would not accept asset purchases that were below their 
recovery level.  Ito (2011) adds that the failure of Congress to establish a clear plan of action for 
TARP, allowed the Treasury to transition from purchasing troubled assets, to directly providing 
capital to ailing firms. This paper will analyze the legislative process, the wording of TARP, and 
overall how the legislation affected moral hazard. 
	  
	  
	  
Executive Branch 
	  
Scholars also examine the executive branch and the role that it played in establishing crisis 
response policies. Stiglitz (2010) argues that both former-President George W. Bush and 
President Barack Obama failed to realize that the banker’s self-interest and the public interest do 
not coincide. The Bush administration argued against government control of taxpayer bailouts, 
claiming that it would go against the ideology of a free market. However, the role of financial 
managers is to use capital to maximize profits for their shareholders. Maximizing profits at times 
may coincide with the public interest of lending to consumers and businesses. But as Stiglitz 
(2010) points out, large banks altered their focus from loaning to individuals and companies, to 
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securitizing and repackaging complex financial instruments and selling them to finance multi- 
million dollar companies. 
Taking a step back, the President is the only official who is elected by the entire electorate 
and hence ought to be the most keen on upholding the national interest. If legislation signed by 
the President fails to uphold the public interest due to increased risk of moral hazard (i.e., 
excessive risk taking), then the Executive also holds a part of the responsibility to mitigate the 
risk of moral hazard. 
	  
	  
	  
The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
	  
A number of scholars note the lack of transparency that the Federal Reserve and U.S. 
Treasury assumed throughout the financial crisis. The decreased transparency of the Federal 
Reserve and the U.S. Treasury can be one possible factor for the increased risk of moral hazard. 
Ferguson and Johnson (2009) analyze the ‘Paulson Put’ where the U.S. Treasury Secretary, 
Henry Paulson, attempted to hide high-profile public financial bailouts through shadow banking 
mechanisms. Ferguson and Johnson (2009) describe how Paulson and Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke, both Republicans appointed to their positions by former-President 
George W. Bush, had an incentive to downplay the severity of the financial crisis until after the 
2008 Presidential Election. Ferguson and Johnson (2009) claim that the Fed Chairman and 
Treasury Secretary created a two-track strategy for getting out of the crisis, specifically aimed at 
rescuing financial firms on Wall Street. The dual strategy was exhibited by the Fed’s extension 
of the discount window to investment banks with the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and 
continued effort to lower the Federal Funds rate. At the same time, Paulson encouraged the 
FDIC to spend down its reserves and took advantage of the GSE bailout of Fannie Mae and 
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Freddie Mac by increasing the amount of deposit insurance from the Treasury to the FDIC from 
	  
$100,000 to $250,000. I plan to examine how the Federal Reserve’s lending facilities and 
policies were characterized throughout the course of the financial crisis. 
The Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury’s lack of transparency came to light through 
Bloomberg News’ victory court case against the Clearing House Association LLC. Bloomberg 
News’ Ivry, Keoun and Kuntz (2011) provide a revealing synopsis of the secret Federal Reserve 
bailout efforts that totaled over $7.77 trillion government assistance. The Federal Reserve was 
forced to disclose which banks received government funds and the extent of federal lending. On 
top of the sheer magnitude of the bailout, the Fed’s actions potentially increased moral hazard by 
providing easier lending facilities to large banks with zero-transparency to Congress or the public.  
The extension of the discount window (i.e., lower interest rate) to investment banks was one of 11 
extended lending facilities that allowed government-funded banks to earn over $13 billion in 
profits. In addition, the lack of transparency of Federal lending facilities occurred 
while Congress was drafting Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) legislation to stabilize 
	  
ailing banks with over $700 billion of taxpayer funds. The authors add that the TARP bailout and 
Fed lending complemented one another with the Fed’s limitless lending facilities that prevented 
banks from total collapse, and further protected the Treasury’s TARP investments. We will 
focus on the dynamic relationship between the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury and Congress 
and the extent to which government policies increased the risk of moral hazard. 
Government policy plays a key role in assisting ailing banks during financial crisis. This 
paper attempts to measure an ambiguous concept of excessive risk-taking to determine whether 
government policy increases the occurrence of moral hazard on the part of small, medium and 
large banks. 
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Chapter Three 
	  
	  
Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard 
	  
	  
3.1 Overview of Analysis 
	  
After a thorough examination of the causes of the financial crisis, the United States 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) concluded that, “a combination of excessive 
borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency put the financial system on a collision 
course with crisis.” This chapter examines the amount of risk that different size banks operated 
with ex ante, during and ex post the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
Financial managers are concerned with maximizing firm profits in order to increase 
shareholders’ earnings. While maximum profits are positive in the investor’s eye, taking on 
excessive risk can be indicative of moral hazard. One measure of a firm’s overall risk is through 
the leverage ratio: the level of a firm’s overall debt issued, divided by shareholder equity5. During 
strong economic times, highly leveraged firms will experience a larger stream of 
revenue, but during an economic downturn, leverage exacerbates losses and can create severe 
liquidity issues if a firm does not have enough equity to finance short-term debt. This study 
compares the debt-to-equity ratio of firms that received government assistance programs from 
the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury versus firms that did not receive any government 
assistance. The results indicate that large government-funded banks operated on the largest 
degree of leverage in comparison to medium and small banks before the financial crisis. In 
combination with Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) findings, the greater degree of leverage ex 
ante, along with increased risk lending activities during government capital injections, is 
indicative of moral hazard. 
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Appendix B for this study’s debt-to-equity calculation 
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The next subsection of this chapter focuses on the policies implemented by the Federal 
Reserve that allowed firms to take on greater risk. Subsection 3.3 analyzes the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury and the unprecedented bailout package that it provided by taxpayer dollars. The 
following subsection 3.4 outlines the empirical analysis to test for moral hazard with Black and 
Hazelwood’s (2012) results and this study’s analysis of debt-to-equity ratios for small, medium 
and large banks. Finally, subsection 3.5 concludes with a summary and analysis of this paper’s 
results. 
	  
	  
	  
3.2 Federal Reserve Financial Crisis Policies 
	  
Federal Funds Rate 
	  
Before separating the risk of various firms, it is important to understand the reasons that 
firms took on greater risk preceding economic downturn of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. One 
of the responsibilities of the Federal Reserve is to regulate the U.S. monetary policy through 
monetary and credit conditions as a way to maximize employment, maintain stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates (Fox et al., 2005). The Federal Reserve regulates U.S. 
monetary policy through the supply of money in the economy, which affects the Federal Funds 
rate. The Federal funds rate represents the interest rate at which a depository institution lends 
available funds that are held at the Federal Reserve, to other depository institutions. The Fed has 
the power to influence the supply and demand for these balances through open market operations 
(OMO) with the purchase or sale of U.S. Treasury securities, managing bank reserve 
requirements and contractual clearing balances, and offering discount window lending to 
depository institutions (Fox et al., 2005).  As noted in Chapter 2, a number of scholars argue that 
a low Federal Funds rate encourages investment into higher risk assets, because of the increased 
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profit opportunity (D’Apice and Ferri, 2010; Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Wright, 2010; Farhi and 
Tirole, 2012).  Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve (1987-2006), and 
other proponents of the ‘Great Moderation’ felt that decreased macroeconomic volatility (i.e., 
low unemployment and inflation) could allow for lower interest rates (D’Apice and Ferri 2010, 
152).  Under this same ideology, the financial markets research and technology had advanced to 
such a degree that the financial sector no longer needed a staunch level of regulation and 
oversight. Therefore, the claim that low interest rates encouraged investment into riskier assets 
did not hold as much force in the Chairman’s eyes. 
Figure 3.1 on the following page depicts the Federal funds rate from the beginning of 
Greenspan’s tenure to the most recent date of data available in January 2013. As Figure 1 
illustrates, throughout the 1990s and even into today, Greenspan and current Chairman, Ben 
Bernanke (2006-Present), maintained an expansionary monetary policy and in effect, driving 
down the Federal funds rate. From August 2000 until April 2004, the Federal Reserve reduced 
the Federal funds rate, from 6.5 percent to 1 percent. An interesting comparison is that the 
housing boom also began during this same time period, with a rise in real estate prices due to the 
increased availability of credit. Specifically, subprime mortgage lending more than doubled 
from 10.1% in 2000 to 20.9% in 2004, in part because of the lower cost of lending (United States 
	  
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2010, 70). 
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Figure 3.1 Effective Federal Funds Rate 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Accessed 11/04/2012 
	  
	  
	  
The interest rate spread refers to the difference between the interest rate that a bank 
borrows funds from the Fed and the interest rate that the bank loans to individuals and 
businesses. A lower Federal funds rate can allow a bank to earn a larger interest rate spread on 
loans sold to consumers and businesses. However, Stiglitz (2010) argues that by allowing big 
banks to access cheaper capital, it creates an incentive for these banks to capitalize on the greater 
interest rate spread in the form of riskier investments. In addition, Stiglitz (2010) claims that as 
the lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve creates an implicit guarantee that they will bear some 
of the losses.  The lower the interest rate in which banks are able to borrow money from the 
Federal Reserve, the greater the interest rate spread and the larger the profit opportunity. 
According to the data in Figure 3.1, from July 2004 to June 2006 the Federal Funds rate 
increased from 1.26 percent to 5.24 percent. The higher interest rate reflected the increased risk 
associated with the larger risk capital inflow that mortgage companies, insurance companies, and 
financial intermediaries were obtaining from selling home loans, auto loans, and other 
securitized investment products. But the interest rate from July 2006 until June 2007 remained 
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relatively stagnant at 5.25 percent, and then began to plummet in August 2007 and remained near 
zero percent throughout the entire financial crisis period. During the heightened period from 
March to September 2008, contrary to historical monetary policy that reflected a higher cost of 
lending due to the increased risk, the Federal Reserve maintained an aggressive expansionary 
monetary policy. While the Federal Funds rate alone does not indicate whether moral hazard 
occurred during the financial crisis, it provides the necessary background why firms would have 
a greater incentive to engage in higher-risk investment activities preceding the financial crisis. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Expanded Federal Lending 
	  
In order to maintain the stability of the financial system, the Fed provides a discount 
window and securities lending. The discount window is a lower interest rate for banks regulated 
under the Federal Reserve to borrow money at depository institutions, and securities lending is a 
temporary source of lending of Treasury and agency securities to primary dealers. While Federal 
control of the nation’s monetary policy and credit assistance to depository institutions helps to 
create a stable financial sector, a number of scholars claim that it can also be a precursor to moral 
hazard (Dowd, 2009; Johnson and Kwak, 2011). 
During the collapse of the housing market, financial intermediaries that were highly 
invested in securitized mortgages, auto loans and other credit loans, faced a liquidity crisis in 
meeting their short-term debt obligations, due to the high rate of borrowers defaulting on their 
loans. The discount window and securities lending was a way that the Fed could provide the 
necessary liquidity to depository institutions to meet their short-term obligations. Along with 
depository banks, investment banks were also severely impacted by loss of capital. However, 
under the Federal Reserve Act (1913) investment banks do not have access to Federal lending 
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programs or discount rates, because they do not adhere to Federal Reserve regulations. 
Investment banks are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), but these two regulatory bodies do not 
provide additional lending facilities (United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). 
In addition, the magnitude of liquidity issues prevented many investment banks from receiving 
private sector funding. 
In the traditional sense of business practices, if an institution failed, shareholders would lose 
everything, and the bondholders would become the shareholders (Stiglitz 2010, 121). However, 
the systemic risk that one institution’s failure placed upon the stability of the entire financial 
sector created a predicament for the Federal Reserve. To prevent major banks from failing, the 
Federal Reserve focused on providing short-term liquidity to both depository and investment 
banks through the extension of credit and the purchase of securities  This response to the 
financial crisis dramatically expanded the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet to unsurpassed 
historical levels. 
Table 3.1 on the following page illustrates the range of programs and lending initiatives 
that were established to prevent the failure of commercial and investment banks. The rate of 
MBS defaults first affected the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market and caused banks 
to draw on their U.S. credit lines. The Term Discount Window Program and Term Auction 
Facility were the first of several Federal lending programs extended to depository institutions in 
2007.  By March 2008 the Federal Reserve responded to investment banks’ liquidity issues with 
short-term loans provided by the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).  Although the 
investment banks did not have to follow Federal Reserve regulatory guidelines preceding the 
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financial crisis, during the beginning stages investment banks were able to receive the safety net 
from the Federal Reserve lending. 
	  
	  
	  
Table 3.1 Extended Federal Reserve Lending Programs 
Date Program Purpose Federal 
Expenditure 
08/17/07 Term Discount 
Window Program 
Extended the terms of discount lending from 
overnight to $90 days 
	  
12-12-07 Term Auction 
Facility 
Credit to depository institutions through an auction 
mechanism 
$109.5 Billion 
12-12-07 Foreign Exchange 
Dollar Swaps 
Exchanges to provide liquidity to foreign financial 
institutions in the short-term market 
$29.1 Billion 
03/11/08 Term Securities 
Lending Facility 
Provided one-month Treasury securities to primary 
dealers 
$250 Billion 
03/16/08 Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility 
Extended credit to primary dealers at the primary 
rate with a reduction of 25 basis points to 3.25 
percent, and increasing the maturity of credit loans 
to 90 days 
N/A 
09/19/08 Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper 
Money Market 
Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility 
Provided funding to depository institutions for asset- 
backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
Unlimited 
Commitment 
09/21/08 Transitional Credit 
Extensions 
U.S. and London broker-dealer subsidiaries of 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch 
N/A 
10/07/08 Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility 
Provided liquidity to the commercial paper market 
with 3-month unsecured and asset backed paper 
$14.3 Billion 
10/21/08 Money Market 
Investor Funding 
Facility 
Provided liquidity to US money market funds and 
other money market investors to encourage 
investment in money market instruments 
$600 Billion 
committed 
11/25/08 Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan 
Facility 
Issued collateralized ABS through consumer and 
business loans 
$43.8 Billion 
07/01/09 Term Securities 
Lending Facility 
Options Program 
Extension of TSLF- Offered an option to primary 
dealers to withdraw short-term TSLF loans in 
exchange for eligible collateral 
N/A 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System website; D’Apice and Ferri, 2010; Goldman, 2009 
	  
	  
	  
In addition to lending facilities, investment banks received substantial bailout packages 
from the Federal Reserve depicted on the following page in Table 3.2.  The expansive list of 
bailed out firms from investment banks Bear Sterns, Citigroup, mortgage lenders Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, and insurance giant AIG deserve further investigation into the relative risk- 
taking behavior that different institutions engaged in. 
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Table 3.2 Federal Reserve Bailouts 
Date Institution Total 
03/14/08 Bear Stearns Fed facilitated buyout 
by JPMorgan Chase 
$26.3 Billion 
07/11/08 FRBNY authorized to lend and 
Treasury extends credit lines to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
N/A 
09/16/08 AIG $85 Billion 
11/23/08 Citigroup- loan-loss backstop $220.4 Billion Committed 
11/25/08 Funding to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to reduce home loan rates 
$149.7 Billion 
01/12/09 Bank of America- loan loss backstop $97 Billion Committed 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System website & David Goldman, CNNMoney.com 
	  
	  
	  
The compilation of Federal Reserve policies in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 illustrate the 
extended lending facilities further supported the market’s expectation of the Federal Reserve as a 
safety net. Given the tremendous amount of government financial assistance, the future risk of 
moral hazard was a serious concern for the financial sector. 
	  
	  
	  
3.3 The U.S. Department of the Treasury and Congress 
	  
By September 2008, the failure of Lehman Brothers had caused the financial markets to go 
into tailspin. The lending facilities and bailout packages provided by the Federal Reserve were 
intended to maintain stability of the financial sector. However, banking activities are highly 
intertwined through the process of buying and selling assets at different banks; therefore, the 
failure of one bank causes a large number of defaults at other banks. The uncertainty in the 
marketplace caused what is referred to as a ‘flight to quality’, where investors buy up risk-free 
Treasury bills6 (United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 74).  In effect, the 
	  
value of securities declined drastically, thereby creating a new wave of financial distress in the 
marketplace. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 U.S. Treasury bills are considered ‘risk-free’ because they are backed by the U.S. Government, which has never 
defaulted on a loan payment. 
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The level of financial distress reached such a level that the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 
Henry Paulson put together a 3-page proposal for Congress, that requested $700 Billion of 
taxpayer funds to buy up toxic assets from ailing financial firms. The Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) represented one of the largest taxpayer funded bailouts in U.S. history. Table 
3.3 on the following page illustrates the total cost of TARP. The program was initially 
implemented to allow the U.S. Treasury to buy illiquid assets off bank balance sheets to continue 
the flow of credit between banks and consumers/businesses. However, five weeks into the 
program the Treasury shifted its focus from buying troubled assets to simply providing liquidity 
to qualified institutions. Similar to Federal Reserve’s extended lending programs, TARP 
beneficiaries included both commercial and investment banks, insurance and mortgage 
companies, and even automobile dealers. The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) was extended 
first program to major financial institutions that required immediate liquidity funding7. CPP was 
	  
later extended to other banks that qualified for funding. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon Co, Citigroup Inc, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc, JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation and Wells Fargo & Company were the first nine recipients of TARP 
and received $125 billion of the first $250 billion TARP funds. 
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Table 3.3 Total Cost of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
Date Programs Purpose Cost 
10/28/08 Capital 
Purchase 
Program 
Program to provide capital to healthy financial 
institutions that did not require government 
subsidization 
$204.7 Billion 
11/10/08 American 
International 
Group Program 
Purchase of preferred-stocks in AIG and reduce 
the Fed’s loan from $85 billion to $60 billion 
$69.8 Billion 
11/23/08 Targeted 
Investment 
Program 
Provided funding or additional funding to financial 
institutions that were considered systemically 
significant 
$40 Billion 
12/19/08 Automotive 
Industry 
Financing 
Program 
Provided funding to GM, Chrysler, GMAC, and 
Chrysler Financial 
$77.6 Billion 
02/09/09 Consumer and 
Business 
Lending 
Initiative 
Purchase of toxic assets to protect private lending 
and losses from MBS [formally TALF] 
$20 Billion 
02/10/09 Public-Private 
Investment 
Program 
Combination of taxpayer and private investment 
funds to purchase toxic assets off the balance 
sheets of ailing financial institutions 
$26.7 Billion 
02/27/09 Asset 
Guarantee 
Program 
Program of funds provided to Citigroup and Bank 
of America 
$5 Billion 
03/04/09 Making Home 
Affordable 
Foreclosure prevention program through 
refinancing 
$27.4 Billion 
03/19/09 Auto Suppliers 
Support 
Program 
TARP funds supplied to GM Supplier 
Receivables, Chrysler Receivables 
$3.5 Billion 
Total 
Treasury 
Committed: 
$700 billion 	   	  
Total 
Treasury 
Invested: 
$356.2 billion 	   	  
Source: Kiel, Paul and Dan Nguyen. 2013. Bailout Tracker: Tracking Every Dollar and Every Recipient. 
ProPublica. 
	  
	  
The compilation of lending programs and bailout packaged between the Federal Reserve 
and the Treasury led the question of whether or not firms that received government safety nets 
engaged in higher risk investments. The analysis of risk taking before, during, and after the 
2007-2009 financial crisis can provide the relevant insight and comparison of banks that received 
government assistance banks and non-government assistance banks. 
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3.4 Empirical Analysis 
	  
This section will test the claim that government assistance programs and bailouts increase 
firm risk taking, therefore creating moral hazard. I begin with a synopsis of Black and 
Hazelwood’s (2012) findings as evidence that moral hazard increased during the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. In order to analyze whether firms took greater risk before the financial crisis, I 
analyze the preceding 2003-2007 period and measure the degree of leverage that different size 
banks and other financial institutions operated on through the debt-to-equity ratio. The inclusion 
of ex ante and ex post risk-taking measurements creates a comprehensive analysis of whether 
government policy increased moral hazard. 
	  
	  
	  
Black and Hazelwood (2012) 
	  
One of the biggest challenges in measuring moral hazard is finding exact instances to 
pinpoint when moral hazard occurred (if at all) during the financial crisis. Black and Hazelwood 
(2012) are able to determine the instance of moral hazard in the 2007-2009 financial crisis with 
the claim that increased risk-taking, in the absence of increased lending, is indicative of moral 
hazard. To measure a bank’s risk-taking, Black and Hazelwood (2012) gathered data from 
November 2007 to August 2010 of the Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL), which 
reports different loan characteristics of commercial and industrial loans (C&I) in the middle 
month of each quarter. C&I loans are important for the banking industry and the business sector 
to provide credit for business practices. The survey is used as a metric to assess short-term 
business credit markets as well as the relative risk of loans. The ability for financial 
intermediaries to meet their short-term obligations was an issue during the financial crisis, and 
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further investigation into the level of bank risk-taking can provide the necessary insight whether 
government lending increased bank risk-taking. 
In addition to the STBL, the authors gathered data from the National Information Center 
(NIC) that lists ‘topholder’ banks (generally bank holding companies), as the ultimate owner of a 
bank involved in internal capital market transactions. Black and Hazelwood (2012) separate 
banks into three categories according to their total assets as follows: (1) Large (over $10 Billion), 
(2) Medium (between $2.5 Billion and $10 Billion), and (3) Small (less than $2.5 Billion). The 
combination of TARP recipients, STBL reports, and NIC banks allow Black and Hazelwood 
(2012) to narrow the analyzed subjects down to 13 large non-TARP banks and 17 large TARP 
banks; 7 medium non-TARP banks and 13 medium TARP banks; 24 non-TARP banks and 7 
small TARP banks. To measure moral hazard, Black and Hazelwood (2012) focus on the risk 
rating of new loan originations, interest rate spreads, and total loan level originations for small, 
medium, and large TARP and non-TARP recipients. 
Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) study is especially useful because as a staff economist at 
the Division of International Finance and an analyst in the Division of Research and Statistics at 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, D.C., the authors have 
access to firm specific STBL data that is not publically disclosed. With the additional 
information of each firm’s response to the STBL, Black and Hazelwood (2012) are able to 
separate loan risk-level ratings for TARP and non-TARP banks. 
The STBL reports the risk rating of new loan originations illustrated in Appendix 1 from 
minimal risk loans (1) to acceptable risk loans (4). In addition to the risk-rating of C&I loans, 
Black and Hazelwood (2012) run a difference-in-difference regression analysis, controlling for 
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the interest, commitment, maturity, the log of loan size, and a dummy variable on whether or not 
the loan’s interest rate is secured or floating. 
By separating banks according to their total assets and relative bank risk taking, Black and 
Hazelwood (2012) emphasized the risk rating and interest rate spread of loan originations as well 
as the total C&I loans outstanding. Overall, large TARP banks originated higher risk, higher 
interest, larger, and longer maturity loans in comparison to non-TARP banks. Conversely, large 
non-TARP banks originated lower risk, but higher interest rate spread C&I loans. Black and 
Hazelwood (2012) note that the interest rate spreads on loan originations by large TARP banks 
rose over 50 basis points compared to non-TARP banks. 
Further, taking account of the total bank size as a ratio of total assets and capitalization, 
TARP banks were originally larger compared to non-TARP banks and grew after TARP capital 
injections. This result relates to the issue of systemic risk preceding the financial crisis, in that 
the failure of one systemically important financial institution, risked the collapse of the entire 
financial sector. Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) results indicate that the issue of systemic risk 
was even greater after TARP capital injections. 
The data also reveals that large TARP banks significantly reduced their total C&I loans for 
the first year following TARP capital injections, and then began to modestly increase lending, but 
with higher risk-rated loans. Black and Hazelwood (2012) claim that the pressure from the public 
to increase lending, and therefore take on greater risk during a financial crisis, caused TARP 
banks to lend more than they otherwise would have during an economic downturn. However, 
Black and Hazelwood (2012) maintain that the risk shifting to higher risk loans, without 
increased overall loan lending of large TARP banks is indicative to moral hazard. 
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Medium-size TARP and non-TARP banks overall took on less risk than large banks. In 
fact, after TARP capital injections, medium TARP banks took on less risk than non-TARP 
medium banks. Interest rate spreads did not significantly increase between TARP and non- 
TARP medium banks. But overall, the risk ratings of new loan originations at medium TARP 
banks are higher than non-TARP banks. 
Small TARP banks began lending more after the after capital injections in comparison to 
small non-TARP banks. Further, the event study reveals that small TARP banks decreased their 
C&I loan level risk-taking more than non-TARP small banks before TARP capital injections. But 
after capital infusions risk-taking levels equalized between TARP and non-TARP banks. This 
provides insight that small banks may have been able to convert additional capital provided by 
the government into more loans. 
Black and Hazelwood (2012) also test for the relative degree of risk-taking based on the 
dollar amount of TARP capital infusions for the three different size banks. Using the same 
difference-in-difference equation and replacing the TARP recipient variable with the log dollar 
amount of capital infusion, Black and Hazelwood (2012) are able to test for a bank’s relative 
risk-taking. The results indicate that for large banks, greater capital infusions led to greater risk- 
taking on future loan originations. Conversely, for small banks, greater infusions led to lower 
risk ratings on future loan originations. 
In summary, Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) results indicate that after TARP capital 
injections, large TARP banks decreased their overall level of new C&I loan originations and 
increased their overall loan risk. Black and Hazelwood (2012) claim that increased risk taking in 
the absence of increased lending is indicative of moral hazard. In their concluding remarks, Black 
and Hazelwood (2012) claim that one issue with TARP is that the purpose of the program 
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was not entirely clear in the beginning. Compounding the issue was the public discourse that 
TARP funds should be converted into loans. However, Black and Hazelwood (2012) note that 
increased lending during an economic downturn are two contradictory responses, which raise the 
overall level of bank risk-taking. Black and Hazelwood (2012) bring tremendous insight to my 
analysis on government policy and bank risk-taking during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. My 
research in the next section attempts to build upon Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) study by 
analyzing firm risk through the debt-to-equity ratio and the periods ex ante and ex post the 
financial crisis. 
	  
	  
	  
3.5 Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
	  
The groundwork to allow financial institutions to take greater risks was established with the 
lower cost of capital, a new influx of complex financial instruments, and government safety nets 
that would provide the necessary security if the market went into a downturn. I use a similar 
methodology of empirical analysis to Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) breakdown of large, 
medium, and small bank risk-taking for TARP and non-TARP bank recipients. I add to Black 
and Hazelwood’s (2012) study by analyzing the preceding years of the collapse of the housing 
market to determine whether different size banks adjusted their risk-taking during the financial 
crisis. I also separate banks based on whether or not the firm received Federal lending facilities 
and/or TARP funds, as banks that are ‘government-funded’, versus banks that did not receive 
government funding as ‘non-funded’. Data acquired through the Survey of Terms of Business 
Lending is voluntary and individual responses under the Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S. § 
552(b)(4)] are confidential. Therefore, I am unable to separate the risk rating of business loans 
for financial intermediaries that required government assistance and those financial firms that 
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were not provided with government financing. While I am not able to gather firm-specific data 
from SBTL, I can gather data from the National Information Center (NIC) that identifies Bank 
Holding Company Performance Report (BHCPR) for the holding company in each Peer Group. 
The Peer Groups are separated by total assets under management and I analyze the first three 
Peer Groups in the first quarter in 2008 with Peer 1 ($10 billion and over), Peer 2 ($3 Billion to 
$10 Billion), and Peer 3 ($1 Billion to $3 Billion). From the 2009 third quarter BHCPR, Peer 
group 1 includes 77 banks, Peer group 2 includes 95 banks, while Peer Group 3 includes 295 
banks. I narrowed the banks for this analysis based upon the availability of data from YCharts 
and compiled the debt-to-equity ratio for 12 large banks government-funded (GF) banks, 5 large 
non-GF banks, 20 medium GF banks, 12 medium non-GF banks, 12 small GF banks, and 12 
small non-GF banks. The calculation for the debt-to-equity ratio for the banks analyzed is as 
follows: 
Debt-to-Equity = (Long-Term Debt + Current Portion of Long-Term Debt)/(Total Shareholder Equity)8 
	  
	  
	  
Unlike Black and Hazelwood (2012) who focused on the financial crisis period from November 
	  
2007 to August 2010, I extend my analysis to a ten-year time period from March 2003 to 
September 2012.  By including a time period prior to the financial crisis, this study will examine 
whether different size banks took greater leverage risks with the backstop of government safety 
nets. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  Shareholder equity is calculated at book value and debt is calculated by the sum of long-term debt and current 
portion of long-term debt, rather than total debt. 
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The role of leverage: 
	  
Leverage allows financial intermediaries to generate revenue by issuing debt and 
accumulating interest on the loans. Recall that a firm’s leverage ratio is the amount of total debt 
divided by total equity. Leverage is impacted by the value of a firm’s securities. For example, a 
firm that has a set leverage ratio of 10 may have $100 worth of assets financed by $10 of equity 
and $90 of debt (mortgages, auto loans, credit loans, etc.). If the price of a security rose by 1%, it 
would cause firm’s equity to rise to $11 and the overall assets to rise to $110, creating a new 
leverage ratio of 9.18 (D’Apice and Ferri 2010, 155). As noted earlier, the firm wishes to keep a 
leverage ratio of 10, and must offer more loans to stabilize the ratio back to 10.  Conversely, 
during an economic downturn, the price of a security generally falls and financial intermediaries 
must attempt to sell securities to pay off issued bonds to obtain the leverage ratio of 10 once 
again. But finding a buyer for a security during an economic downturn can be more difficult and 
create a liquidity shortage for a financial intermediary to finance its short-term debts. In 
addition, the greater degree that a firm is leveraged, the higher the amount of relative profits or 
losses a firm will incur. Therefore, the leverage ratio provides a relevant risk metric to analyze 
the level of risk that large, medium, and small banks operated on over a ten-year analysis period 
from March 2003 to September 2012. 
Some scholars argue that the housing crisis initially began in 2003 with the expansion of 
structured financial products through securitization--the reselling of illiquid assets as a security 
to investors (D’Apice and Ferri, 2010).   Securitization became more pronounced through the 
complex ‘originate to distribute’ (OTD) business model, where illiquid assets (i.e., commercial 
and residential mortgages, auto loans, and credit card loans) are sold to an arranger (i.e., broker), 
who then sells the loan to a third party issuer: a conduit, Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV) or 
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Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that separates the financial instrument into different ‘tranches’ 
equitable to its relative risk and return. The issuer then issues the newly asset-backed securities 
(ABS) in the form of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that can re-securitize MBS into collateralized 
mortgage obligations (CMO), collateralized loan obligations (CLO), and credit default swaps 
(D’Apice and Ferri, 2010). 
The process of securitization is an important factor that contributed to the high degree of 
leverage that a number of financial firms took on preceding the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
More specifically, securitization allows traditional banks to remove riskier loans from their 
balance sheets because the loan is being sold to a third party (Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, 2011).  During the era of deregulation, proponents claimed that securitization 
spread the risk of a financial instrument over a number of parties. However, the recent financial 
crisis revealed that no matter how diversified and spread out a higher-risk securitized asset may 
be organized, the magnitude of defaults on securitized loans created a ripple effect that is 
detrimental to the financial sector. 
	  
	  
	  
Large Government-Funded and Non-Funded Banks: 
	  
Figure 3.2 on the following page depicts the leverage ratio of large banks that received 
government funding from the Federal Reserve and/or U.S. Treasury. Previous research indicates 
that during strong economic times financial firms will increase their leverage, but during 
economic downturns, financial firms will deleverage their operating status in order to meet their 
short-term debt obligations (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011).  This relationship is apparent 
among large banks that received government assistance. Figure 3.2 illustrates the higher degree 
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of leverage of large government-funded banks preceding the financial crisis and the succeeding 
economic downturn and resulting deleveraging of large government-funded banks. The 
procyclical relationship also illustrates the limited ability of the debt-to-equity ratio to analyze 
moral hazard during severe economic downturns. However, by incorporating Black and 
Hazelwood’s (2012) results, further analysis reveals that large government-funded banks 
engaged in higher risk lending after TARP capital injections. In addition, large banks overall 
were lending less during this time period. The combination of Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) 
provides the conclusion that the greater degree of leverage ex ante, along with increased risk 
lending activities after government capital injections is indicative of moral hazard. 
	  
Figure 3.2 Large Government-Funded Banks (a) 
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Figure 3.3                                          Large Non-Funded Banks 
 
	  
	  
	  
As previously noted in Table 3.2 (on page 25.), on March 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve 
provided JPMorgan Chase with $25 billion to facilitate the company’s buyout of Bear Sterns, 
and in response large government leverage ratios continued to rise. In July 2008, the U.S. 
government announced plans to help support two major mortgage lenders, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. As depicted in Figure 3.2, despite the clear signs that economic turmoil, the 
leverage ratio of large government-funded bank’s continued to rise. Conversely, illustrated 
above in Figure 3.3, large non-government-funded banks began to deleverage during the 2006- 
2008 period. As Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 represent, the leverage ratio for the majority of large 
government-funded banks analyzed, continued to rise until September 2008, with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers and the market downturn. 
Figure 3.2 reveals the pro-cyclical leverage that large government-funded banks engaged in 
throughout the time period analyzed. However, a number of anomalies are apparent in the figure 
that can cause a distorted view for proper analysis. Specifically, Citigroup was highly invested 
in credit default swaps (CDS), which one reason for the firm’s larger debt-to-equity ratio. 
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Further, Goldman Sachs Group and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies in 2008 in 
order to receive Federal lending facilities, and therefore were not subject to the same leverage 
and reserve requirements that bank holding companies must adhere to under the Federal Reserve. 
	  
Figure 3.4 below illustrates the debt-to-equity ratio of large government-funded banks, 
with the exclusion of Citigroup, Goldman Sachs Group, and Morgan Stanley. In Figure 3.4, 
JPMorgan appears to be operating on a substantially higher debt-to-equity ratio compared to the 
other banks in the figure. JPMorgan was the seventh-largest beneficiary of Federal lending 
facilities and the eighth-largest recipient of TARP-funds (Keoun et al., 2011; Kiel and Nguyen, 
2013).  The results bring insight that firms that operated on a greater degree of leverage, and 
therefore overall risk, also received greater government financial support. 
	  
Figure 3.4 Large Government-Funded Banks (b) 
 
Source: Figure 3.2, excluding State Street, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. The vertical line at 
09/15/08 represents the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
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Until the failure of Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve had worked to ensure that ailing 
financial firms would be able to meet their short-term obligations. Alan Greenspan is quoted in 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming stating “[e]ven if banks find that borrowing from the discount window 
is not immediately necessary, the knowledge that liquidity is available should help alleviate 
concerns about funding.” (Keoun, 2011).  As Table 3.1 illustrated on page 24, the Federal 
Reserve extended a number of lending facilities to both commercial and investment banks. 
Therefore, until the failure of Lehman Brothers, large banks exhibited the market’s expectations 
that the government would provide necessary lending to firms that held a systemic risk. 
The increased leverage ratio, and therefore greater risk preceding the failure of Lehman 
Brothers is indicative of moral hazard. In fact, the failure of Lehman Brothers provides insight to 
the argument of moral hazard. To reiterate, moral hazard occurs when a company has an 
incentive to take greater risks than it otherwise would, because the company gains all the benefits 
from excessive risk-taking, but does not bear all of the losses. Until the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, large government-funded banks were operating on greater risk in comparison to large- 
government banks that did not require additional government funds. 
Figure 3.5 on the following page illustrates the average debt-to-equity ratio for large 
government-funded and non-funded banks from March 2003-September 2012. The spread in 
leverage remained relatively constant between government-funded and non-funded banks from 
March 2003 until December 2006. The data reveals an interesting comparison between large 
government-funded and non-funded banks in January 2007, where large government-funded 
banks increased their debt-to-equity ratio until August 2007, but during the same time period 
large non-funded banks significantly reduced their debt-to-equity ratio. 
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Figure 3.5 Average Debt-to-Equity Ratio: Large Banks 
 
Source: Figure 3.2 and 3.3 
	  
	  
	  
The compilation of data for large government-funded and non-funded banks reveals that 
large government-funded banks operated on a greater degree of leverage throughout the period 
before the financial crisis, and continued to leverage their operations until the failure of Lehman 
Brothers. While the leverage ratio for these firms has decreased relative to the period preceding 
the financial crisis, large government-funded banks are still operating on a greater degree of risk 
compared to large non-funded banks and therefore still pose a systemic risk to the financial 
sector. 
	  
	  
	  
Medium Government-Funded and Non-Funded Banks: 
	  
The debt-to-equity ratio for medium government-funded and non-funded banks contrasted 
the findings of large banks in the previous section. Figure 3.6 on the following page illustrates 
that prior to 2007, medium government-funded banks were deleveraging their portfolios and 
therefore taking on less risk. As depicted in Figure 3.6 on the following page, the leverage ratio 
for medium government-funded banks fell drastically from June 2004 to December 2007.  This 
relates to Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) findings that between 2007-2010 medium TARP banks 
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reduced their overall risk-taking more than non-TARP banks. Further, in comparing medium 
government-funded banks to medium non-government-funded banks in Figure 3.7, medium 
government-funded banks overall were less leveraged prior to 2007. However, also similar to 
large government-funded banks, medium government-funded banks increased their leverage 
ratio from December 2007 until June 2008.  The fall in equity prices was one reason for the fall 
in equity prices and the rise in systemic risk on the part of medium size banks. 
	  
Figure 3.6 Medium Government-Funded Banks (a) 
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Figure 3.7 Medium Non-Government-Funded Banks (a) 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Similar to anomalies in the previous section’s dataset, the volatile changes in debt-to-equity 
ratio obstruct the data necessary for detailed analysis of less-leveraged financial firms. Figure 
3.8 and 3.9 on the page 43 and 44 depict the debt-to-equity ratios for medium firms, excluding 
firms that were excessively leveraged. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 provide an interesting result in that 
medium government-funded banks were operating on a similar degree of leverage in comparison 
to their non-government-funded counterparts. Figure 3.10 on page 44 illustrates that unlike the 
case of large government-funded and non-funded banks, the degree of leverage between medium 
government-funded banks and non-government-funded banks decreased preceding the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers and remained relatively similar following the crash. Further in comparing 
medium government-funded banks to medium non-government-funded banks, medium 
government-funded banks overall were less leveraged prior to 2007. However, also similar to 
large government-funded banks, medium government-funded banks increased their leverage ratio 
from December 2007 until June 2008.  This result also leads to the conclusion that medium 
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government-funded banks engaged in greater risk taking preceding the failure of Lehman 
	  
Brothers. 
	  
Overall, medium non-government-funded banks decreased their leverage ratio between 
December 2007 and March 2008 and then increased their leverage ratio from March 2008 to 
June 2008.  In comparing government-funded and non-government-funded medium banks, it 
appears that non-government-funded banks did not exhibit a common pattern of leveraging and 
deleveraging their portfolios. For example, the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
caused a varied effect of firms decreasing and increasing their leverage ratios. While non- 
government-funded banks deleveraged their portfolios after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the 
degree to which non-government-funded banks decreased their leverage was much smaller than 
medium government-funded banks. 
Figure 3.8 Medium Government-Funded Banks (b) 
 
Source: Figure 3.6 excluding Central Pacific Financial Corp, Heartland Financial, Iberiabank, MB Bancorp, 
Republic Bancorp and SVB Financial. The vertical line at 09/15/08 represents the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
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Figure 3.9 Medium Non-Funded Banks (b) 
 
Source: Figure 3.7 excluding Cathay General Bancorp, Chemical Financial, First Interstate, Renasant Corp and 
UMB Financial. The vertical line at 09/15/08 represents the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
	  
	  
	  
Figure 3.10 Average Debt-to-Equity Ratio: Medium Banks 
 
Source: Figure 3.6 and 3.7 
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Small Government-Funded and Non-Funded Banks: 
	  
Small government-funded and non-funded banks operated on smaller debt-to-equity ratios 
in comparison to large and medium banks. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 illustrate the debt-to-equity 
ratio over the ten-year analysis period for small banks. The leverage ratio for small government- 
funded banks exhibited a similar pattern to medium government-funded banks, in that small 
government-funded banks decreased their leverage ratios until March 2007. However, Figure 
3.11 reveals that small government-funded banks increased their leverage ratios from March 
	  
2007, throughout during the height of the financial crisis, until the failure of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008.  Therefore, similar to medium government-funded banks, small government- 
funded banks made efforts to reduce their risk taking prior to the financial crisis and do not 
exhibit actions of moral hazard. 
	  
Figure 3.11: Small Government-Funded Banks 
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Figure 3.12: Small Non-Funded Banks 
 
	  
	  
	  
Following the dramatic collapse of the stock market in September 2008, the leverage ratio 
for small government-funded firms began to fall. According to of Black and Hazelwood’ (2012) 
results, small TARP bank originated more loans than non-TARP small banks, but these loans 
were also less risky. This provides an interesting comparison to my leverage results in that the 
leverage ratio for government-funded small banks fell to levels below the preceding financial 
crisis period. Meanwhile, leverage ratios for small non-government-funded banks remained 
relatively stable throughout the ten-year period being analyzed. Therefore, small government- 
funded banks shifted their risk taking strategy to less risky investments, while non-government- 
funded banks did not alter their risk taking strategy. 
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Figure 3.13: Average Debt-to-Equity Ratio: Small Banks 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Source: Figures 3.11 and 3.12. Excluding Farmers Capital Bank Corporation and Financial Institutions 
	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  
Analysis of Results: 
	  
In summary, large government-funded banks illustrated the greatest amount of risk-taking 
compared to medium and small government-funded and non-funded banks before the financial 
crisis. In compilation of Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) findings, large government-funded 
banks, continued to take greater risks, exhibited by the higher risk-rated C&I loans after TARP 
capital injections. The greater amount of risk compounded with the losses incurred by the 
government, reveals that moral hazard on the part of large government-funded banks occurred. 
The failure of Lehman Brothers and the resulting TARP legislation signifies a significant 
decrease in large and medium bank holding company leverage ratios. Conversely, small banks 
exhibited a moderate change in leverage ratios, with small non-funded banks even operating on a 
greater leverage ratio than small government-funded banks.  This result indicates the importance 
of Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) study to determine the loan-level risk different size banks were 
loaning during the crisis and government capital injection period. 
In addition, this study’s results indicate that large banks operated on a large debt-to-equity 
ratio and therefore held a greater systemic risk to the financial sector. The magnitude of large 
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banks and interconnected investments relates to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ phenomenon of the financial 
crisis, whereby large banks that pose a systemic risk to the overall economy cannot be allowed to 
fail. The greater leverage ratio by large financial firms is due in part because of the lower risk 
premiums that larger banks receive because of the marketplaces’ perspective that these institutions 
are in fact too-big-to-fail (Evanoff and Moeller, 2012). The ‘too-big-to-fail’ phenomenon feeds 
into the market’s perceived risk of a firm’s failure of default, in that the firm holds too large of a 
position in the financial sector to allow the bank to fail. The results of a recent study by 
Bloomberg News found that large ‘TBTF’ banks are earning a 0.8 percentage 
point taxpayer subsidy that amounts to $83 billion a year9 (Ueda and Weder di Mauro, 2013). 
	  
Further, the top five banks, JPMorgan, Bank of America Corp, Citigroup Inc, Wells Fargo Co. 
and Goldman Sachs Group Inc account for $64 billion of the total subsidy. In this sense, large 
banks are encouraged by the market to make riskier investments, provided that the government is 
there as a safety net. 
The next chapter will discuss the role that different government bodies hold in mitigating 
excessive risk-taking and the reforms adopted to prevent the risk of moral hazard and systemic 
collapse. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Bloomberg calculated bank subsidies by multiplying large banks borrowing discount rate of 0.8 by a bank’s total 
liabilities (including bonds and customer deposits). 
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Chapter Four 
	  
	  
Government Role and Moral Hazard 
	  
	  
	  
This chapter focuses on the role that different government bodies played in implementing 
policies that provided the incentive for firms to take greater risks. The initial goal of the Federal 
Reserve was to provide the proper stability to an economy plagued with financial panics. But in 
the most recent financial crisis, the nation’s lender of last resort was unable to meet the liquidity 
needs of ailing financial institutions. Banks became so large, requiring such a degree of financial 
assistance, that the main institutional body endowed with this power was unable to do so.  The 
manner and effectiveness of the government’s response to a financial crisis can affect the degree 
of economic recession. Elizabeth Warren, former-Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel, 
claims (and I agree), that the most effective government response to a financial crisis ensures 
strong accountability and transparency measures and lays out a clear plan of action (September 
Oversight Report). However, the government response during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
not only revealed a weakness of the financial sector, but also a weakness of federal government 
response to mitigate excessive risk-taking and economic recession. If the government fails to 
uphold proper emergency response policies, it can incentivize firms to take greater risks than 
otherwise, provided that they have the government as a safety net. 
This begs the question: has the U.S. financial system outgrown its regulatory system? Many 
scholars on the surface may agree, but digging deeper I believe that there is more to the story. I 
believe that at another level of analysis, we are able to examine the Federal Reserve, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Congress and the Presidency by the manner in which each 
government body is structured and the policies implemented, as one reason for the greater degree 
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of risks and losses on the part of financial institutions. Specifically, I compare members of 
Congress and the President, who are chosen by their electorates, versus the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who are politically appointed. In the case of 
TARP, American taxpayers carried many of the losses due to moral hazard; therefore, there is a 
clear issue of ‘public interest’ in how the government regulates during financial crisis10. 
My starting hypothesis is that given a greater amount of transparency and reliance on 
	  
public support, democratically elected government bodies, rather than politically appointed 
government bodies should be more sensitive to public opinions and enact legislation that reduces 
the risk of moral hazard.  In order to investigate the role that different government bodies held in 
mitigating greater risks during the financial crisis a chronological analysis of events and relevant 
government response are examined in this chapter. First, it is important to lay out the role that 
each governing body holds in financial regulation and how these roles are interconnected with 
other government bodies. This is followed by, an analysis of the roles of politically appointed 
and democratically elected government entities in the enactment of Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP). The next section will compare the TARP legislation enacted during the 
financial crisis, versus the Dodd-Frank (2010) legislative reforms enacted after the financial 
crisis. The following sections will analyze the relative effectiveness of government policy in 
reducing the risk of moral hazard. 
	  
	  
	  
4.1 Interrelations of U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
	  
The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve are two main government bodies responsible 
for proper oversight of financial markets. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Federal lending facilities and programs are not directly related to the public interest because the Federal Reserve 
is a private entity.  Conversely, TARP was a taxpayer funded bailout and concerns the public interest. 
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Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury are both politically appointed government 
bodies that work together to establish effective oversight and proper policies to maintain 
economic stability. 
	  
	  
	  
Role of the U.S. Treasury 
	  
The U.S. Treasury Secretary is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to 
serve in the Executive Branch Cabinet. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, is responsible for 
printing currency, managing Federal finances and the public debt, collecting taxes and enforcing 
the Federal finance and tax laws. In addition, the U.S. Treasury advises the President on 
domestic and international financial, monetary, economic, trade and tax policy (U.S. Department 
of the Treasury). The mission of the U.S. Treasury Department is stated as follows: 
“Maintain a strong economy and create economic and job opportunities by promoting the 
conditions that enable economic growth and stability at home and abroad, strengthen national 
security by combating threats and protecting the integrity of the financial system, and manage 
the U.S. Government’s finances and resources effectively.” 
	  
	  
	  
The Treasury has a large number of bureaus including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the U.S. Mint, the Inspector General, and the 
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). The Treasury is able to utilize 
these additional bureaus to ensure economic stability. 
	  
	  
	  
Role of the Federal Reserve 
	  
The leadership within the Federal Reserve is organized in a similar fashion to the U.S. 
Treasury. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, along with the seven other Board of Governors 
members, are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to serve 14-year terms 
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(The Federal Reserve Board, 2003).  According to the Federal Reserve: Functions and Purposes 
“Congress chartered the Federal Reserve Banks for a public purpose. The Reserve Banks are the 
operating arms of the central banking system, and they combine both public and private elements 
in their makeup and organization” (Fox et al. 2005).  The Federal Reserve holds a similar mission 
by influencing the U.S. monetary system and credit conditions to create maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates (Fox et. al 2005).  The Federal Reserve 
controls U.S. monetary policies, regulates the banking sector to ensure protection of consumers, 
provides financial services to depository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign official 
institutions, and operates the nation’s payments system (Fox et. al 2005). 
The Fed is considered an independent central bank because its actions do not have to be 
ratified by the President or anyone else in the executive. While the Federal Reserve has a greater 
degree of power, members of the Board frequently testify before Congressional committees on 
the economy, monetary policy, banking supervision and regulation, consumer credit protection, 
financial markets, and other matters. The Chairman of the Board of Governors testifies before 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; addressing the efforts, activities, 
and objectives and plans of the Board of the Governors & FOMC and the Board has regular 
contact with members of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors (Fox et al. 2005). The 
Congressional oversight of the Federal Reserve works to facilitate greater transparency between 
the two main government bodies. 
	  
	  
	  
4.2 Initial Response to Crisis: The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
	  
The first signs of financial calamity were apparent in August 9, 2007 when institutions 
highly invested in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) money markets were unable to 
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rollover their outstanding volumes (D’Apice and Ferri, 2010).  The Federal Reserve Board 
announced the following day that the Fed “will provide reserves as necessary…in current 
circumstances, depository institutions may experience unusual funding needs because of 
dislocations in money and credit markets. As always, the discount window is available as a 
source of funding” (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2011).  We now know that this was just 
one small bump in the road, or maybe even a call for help that the financial markets were headed 
down a road toward disaster. But what is also important to note is the regulatory response to 
these signals and the overall response to the financial crisis. 
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve first attempted to combat the economic downturn by 
reducing the Federal Funds rate to allow banks to lend at a lower rate. The mission of the U.S. 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve both are focused on providing economic growth and stability 
through employment objectives and proper financial oversight. Therefore, the greater public 
interest appears to be in mind through both government bodies objectives. But within each of 
these missions it seems that there is a trickle down ideology: A directly supports B, but should 
also indirectly support C. For example, with the overarching goal to reduce the severity of the 
financial crisis, first, the U.S. Treasury printed Treasury bonds that the Federal Reserve bought 
in order to increase the supply of money in the economy, thereby reducing the interest rate that 
banks were charged to borrow money. The direct result (B) of this policy was to reduce the 
interest rate, but the indirect result (C) was intended to continue the flow of credit between 
lenders and consumers/businesses. However, the issue is that the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve only have the power to influence monetary policy, but these two government bodies do 
not have the authority to mandate bank-lending levels. 
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As noted in the previous chapter, any lending during a financial crisis is subject to a greater 
degree of risk. Consequentially, encouraging banks to continue to lend is counter-intuitive to the 
objective of creating a stable economy if banks are incurring higher-risk lending. Further, the 
Federal Reserve has the authority to set up minimum reserve requirements, but as Black and 
Hazelwood (2012) illustrated, the lending of C&I loans plummeted after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers during the financial crisis. Rather than having to discourage banks from lending too 
much, in October 2008 the Federal Reserve and Treasury were faced with the predicament in 
how to encourage banks to lend to more consumers and businesses. The lack of bank lending 
worsened the financial crisis with businesses unable to borrow and forced to cut their costs. This 
provides an interesting comparative, in that the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve have the 
authority to encourage or discourage lending, but the government bodies do not have direct 
control to accomplish these objectives. 
One issue with the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury’s emergency response was the ad- 
hoc approach toward stemming the financial crisis. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
concluded that the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury were ill prepared for a major financial 
crisis and had underestimated the nation’s financial distress (United States Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission, 2010). For example, in the case of Bear Sterns, in March 2008 the major 
investment bank notified the Federal Reserve that the company was at risk of insolvency and 
would not have access to the private sector for additional lending.  The Federal Reserve Board 
authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to facilitate JPMorgan’s acquisition of Bear 
Sterns, where shareholders were not entirely wiped out and bondholders were fully protected. 
However, in the case of Fannie Mae in July 2008, shareholders lost everything and bondholders 
were fully protected (Stiglitz, 2010). Nonetheless, the issue of moral hazard for the Federal 
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Reserve and the U.S. Treasury was concerning because the regulators were providing the 
market’s expectation of a government safety net. 
	  
	  
	  
4.3 Increased Financial Severity: The Fed, Treasury, and Congress 
	  
Until September 2008, the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury had not allowed a single 
systemically important financial institution to fail; therefore, providing the implicit guarantee that 
large financial institutions would have the federal government as a safety net. When Lehman 
Brothers faced liquidity issues, on September 12th, 2008 the President of the Federal Bank of 
New York (FRBNY) at the time, Timothy Geithner brought together 12 major financial 
institutions to discuss a private-sector rescue of the investment bank giant. The firms committed 
$40 billion to rescue Lehman’s real estate assets and the overall firm, but as we all know, a 
private-sector rescue never occurred (United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). 
Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 creating a wave of 
financial panic. 
Initially, the Federal Reserve justified their decision to not bailout Lehman Brothers, 
because of the future risk of moral hazard in the market, the potential negative political reaction, 
the lack of a private firm acquisition, and impact on management in the financial system who had 
expected another Federally funded bailout (United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
2011). After Lehman’s failure, the Federal Reserve justified their decision by 
claiming that they did not have the legal authority to bail out the investment bank. No matter the 
Fed’s reasoning, at the time of Lehman Brothers’ failure, it was the fourth largest investment 
bank in the U.S. and held a systemic risk to the financial sector. 
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Lehman’s failure furthered the necessity of additional lending facilities to American 
Insurance Group (AIG), a large insurance company that was also having difficulty turning over 
its short-term debts. AIG posed a systemic risk to the financial sector due to its large investment 
in credit default swaps (CDS) and mortgage backed securities (MBS) among other securitized 
investment products. Therefore, at the same time of Lehman’s failure, the Federal Reserve and 
the U.S. Treasury had to make a critical decision if it was going to allow another systemically 
important financial institution (SIFI) to fail. 
AIG turned to the Federal Reserve to discuss additional lending through the discount 
window and possibly other additional financing. Members at a meeting preceding the failure of 
Lehman Brothers noted that the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Timothy 
Geithner, made his stand on a government bailout very clear: government funds would not be 
available and the private sector had to find a solution (Congressional Oversight Panel June 
2010).  The markets were left wondering if the Fed and Treasury would stand by the argument 
that ailing companies would have to seek additional financial through the private sector. When 
questioned at a press conference whether or not the Fed was providing a bridge loan to AIG from 
the U.S. Treasury, Secretary Henry Paulson responded, “What is going on right now in New 
York has nothing to do with any bridge loan from the government. What’s going on in New 
York is a private-sector effort” (Congressional Panel June 2010).  At this point, it appeared that 
the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury were concerned with mitigating the risk of moral hazard 
by preventing a government bailout. 
Despite the Fed’s efforts to pursue a private sector bailout of AIG, the severity of the 
company’s liquidity issues turned many possible lenders away. A participant at the AIG rescue 
effort at FRBNY noted that there was a sense among bankers that AIG’s issues were too large 
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for the private-sector banks to solve, especially given the limited time frame available. The vice 
chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System explained the failure of a 
private sector bailout stating that “effort was unsuccessful in deteriorating economic and 
financial environment in which firms were not willing to expose themselves to risks” (December 
Oversight Report, 2010).  While the Fed had worked to facilitate a private-funded bailout for 
AIG, the risks were deemed too large. 
If the Federal Reserve allowed AIG fail, major financial firms would be subject to even 
greater risks because most major banks had exposure to AIG investments in some form. Over 
the past eight years AIG had progressively increased its investments in CDS markets, which in 
turn left many other banks at risk if AIG was unable to continue the flow of credit (United States 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 344). The failure of a private-sector bailout left the 
Federal Reserve as the only funding resource available. After the chaotic financial sector and 
overall nation’s response to the failure of Lehman Brothers, the Fed could not risk letting another 
systemically significant financial institution fail and set aside $85 billion to bailout AIG. 
While the U.S. Treasury and Fed worked together to continue the flow of credit and a 
stable economy, the lower Federal Funds rate and extended Federal lending programs were not 
enough to calm the storm that occurred with the failure of Lehman. The level of financial 
instability and risk of major financial firms required the Fed to expand its balance sheet to 
support ailing financial firms. The ‘necessity’ of Federal Reserve financial assistance reached 
such a level that Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson requested additional funding from Congress 
to assist ailing financial institutions. 
The actions of Congress and the response of the U.S. President during a financial crisis 
provides insight to the nation’s ability to quell a financial crisis, as well as the holes in regulatory 
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bodies that need to be mended. While the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department and the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve are focused on the nation’s monetary and financial 
policy, democratically elected bodies Congress and the President are focused on a much larger 
number of policies and industries. In order to understand the Congressional perspective of a 
financial crisis it is important to backtrack and lay out the structure of Congressional elections, 
terms, and responsibilities. 
	  
	  
	  
Role of Congress 
	  
Members of Congress are elected by their representative states, where House of 
Representatives serve 2-year terms and Senator serve 6-year terms. House members and Senator 
serve on a number of committees in Congress from Agriculture to Small Business where they 
vote, sponsor bills, and can offer amendments. Leaders are elected within the House and Senate 
include a speaker, a majority and minority leader, assistant leaders, whips, and party caucus. The 
structure of Congress allows congressmen and congresswoman to rely on the support of their 
constituents to remain in office. Along with public disclosure of each House and Senate 
member’s vote on a bill, the expansive media coverage on Congressional activities holds the 
democratically elected body to greater degree transparency and accountability for their 
legislative policies. 
	  
In terms of financial and banking regulations, Congress can pass legislation with new 
reforms and regulations that alter the risk-taking activities of banks. The House Committee on 
Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs are 
responsible for the passage of various legislative reforms that affect banking and financial 
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activities. During the recent financial crisis, these two committees were responsible for the 
passage of the financial and banking reforms. 
The original TARP program requested that Congress provide the Treasury with taxpayer 
funds without specific Congressional oversight or judicial review (Stiglitz, 2010).  Not only was 
the requested amount unprecedented, but the U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson failed to 
establish a clear plan of action in how the funds would be used to stabilize the economy. 
Congress voted on TARP the same way all legislation is passed through Congress. Given the 
limited amount of Congressional oversight and program details, the House of Representatives 
rejected the TARP bill (Appendix C). The securities markets responded negatively to the 
House’s rejection with the Dow falling 777 points in one day.11  The overall economic calamity 
	  
resulted in an auction held by the Bush administration, that essentially asked each congressperson 
how much they required in gifts to their constituents in order to sway their vote (Stigliz, 2010).  
The thirty-two Democrats and twenty-six Republicans received a total of $110 billion in 
earmarks, as special tax provisions for their constituents under the revised bill. Among these 
provisions included an excise tax for wooden arrows for children in Oregon, a seven-year cost 
recovery period for NASCAR racetracks, and increased funding for U.S. wool fabric makers and 
clothing manufacturers (Anderson et al. 2008). While pork barrel benefits specific Congressmen 
and their constituents, debate over localized spending during the time of a historic financial crisis 
clearly does not have the overall public interest in mind. 
Appendix C provides a chronological illustration of the legislative process of TARP along 
with the policy’s passage and implementation of the program. The passage of TARP highlights 
the contradicting objectives of time-consuming legislative processes, and the time-sensitive 
issues during a financial crisis. The legislative process takes a considerable amount of time in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Wall Street Journal. Historical Prices. http://quotes.wsj.com/DJI/index-historical-prices 
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Washington, where lobbyists and other interest parties can bring their relative interests to 
Congress to suggest legislative reforms. Members of Congress in the House of Representatives 
and/or Senate can sponsor a bill, and if brought onto the a committee’s agenda is voted on to be 
brought to the floor. If the bill passes through committee it is scheduled on the floor calendar 
then moves to the floor of the House of Representatives, where it must pass a simple majority, 
(fifty percent or more of the House members must vote yes). If the bill passes, it moves on to the 
Senate’s relevant committee to be voted on, but if the bill does not receive a simple majority it 
fails and can either be reformed with necessary changes to be voted on again, or ‘die’ in 
Congress. Bills voted on in the Senate must also receive a simple majority to pass. But an 
important component of the Senate is that members have the power to filibuster, that allows them 
to debate a bill on the Senate floor for an indeterminate period of time, therefore delaying vote. 
Senate members opposed to the delayed voting have the power to stop a filibuster through a 
cloture, requiring 60 or more Senate votes. While a number of other details are involved in the 
legislative voting process, this offers a picture of the slow legislative process that Congress must 
go through in order to pass a law. However, while legislation is slow, markets are constantly 
changing and react instantaneously to policies measures that affect securities markets. During 
the financial crisis, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve were forced to 
turn to Congress for additional lending facilities to prevent a complete economic collapse of the 
U.S. economy. 
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4.4 Financial Crisis Legislation: TARP 
	  
The goal of TARP was unclear to Americans from the beginning. The media did a great 
job portraying that Congress had committed $700 billion of taxpayer funds, but the intended use 
of these funds was not illustrated clearly. Because major institutions were using taxpayer funds, 
a common assumption was that this would allow for the continual flow of credit between 
consumers and lenders. But the freezing of credit and lack of bank lending following the 
collapse of Lehman created anger and distrust from the public on the part of the U.S. financial 
sector. In order to analyze the goals and effectiveness of TARP, it is important to establish the 
original language of the program. The mission of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(EESA) of 2008 (Kennedy 2008) follows: 
	  
“To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of 
troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the 
economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 to provide incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend certain expiring 
provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other purposes” 
	  
	  
	  
The purpose of EESA illustrates the overarching goal to stabilize the economy, but not at the 
expense of the taxpayer, thereby keeping the public interest in mind. The Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) was established under the EESA and the purpose of the Act is as follows 
(Kennedy 2008): 
“The Secretary is authorized to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (or ‘TARP’) to 
purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial 
institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary, and in accordance 
with this Act and the policies and procedures developed and published by the Secretary.” 
	  
	  
	  
In terms of TARP, as long as the economy was stabilized and taxpayer funds were not used 
for other purposes, than the interest of the public would be met. Upon the passage of TARP 
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Congress stated that the purpose of EESA was to “immediately provide authority and facilities 
that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system 
of the United States” (December Oversight Report, 2010).  TARP was originally intended to buy 
toxic assets off the balance sheets of ailing financial firms, but just five weeks after the 
legislation’s passage the objective shifted from buying illiquid assets to purchasing non-voting 
preferred stock in banks and institutions and therefore directly investing taxpayer dollars (Ghosh 
and Mohamed 2010).  Paulson defended his shift in policy during an interview with CNBC in 
November 2008 stating: 
“We were always focused on one thing, capital in the banks and illiquid assets in the banks. And 
this was a good idea when we went to Congress, it’s still a good idea, but we changed strategy 
when the facts changed. Because let me explain the strategy: purchasing illiquid assets adds 
capital, price discovery, encourages more private capital to come in. But by the time that the 
process with Congress was completed, it was clear that we were facing a much more severe 
situation than we had envisioned earlier on” (CNBC.com Interview 2008). 
	  
Secretary Paulson’s reasoning correlates to the issue discussed in the previous section, in 
that the timing of legislation and the timing of changes in the securities markets are not 
correlated. While Congress was in deliberations over TARP, the securities markets were 
declining drastically. The U.S. Treasury responded to the economic severity with direct capital 
injections in an attempt to restore confidence and prevent further decline in the securities 
markets. 
By directly purchasing ‘troubled’ assets, TARP would work to free up the frozen credit 
markets—a policy that aligned with the public interest. The alteration of the TARP program to 
purchase non-voting preferred shares provided financial institutions with additional capital. 
However, the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve, nor Congress had the authority to determine where 
TARP dollars were spent—a policy that was out of line with the public interest. 
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The new policy of the Treasury to purchase non-voting shares in financial institutions 
angered many members of Congress who felt they had been manipulated into voting for TARP 
legislation that would do more to benefit Wall Street than ailing homeowners. After the 
Treasury announced the changes in TARP legislation, the head of the TARP Program Neel 
Kashkari testified before Congress to explain the change in Treasury policy. A clash of interests 
was apparent when Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) exclaimed, “I don’t think anyone 
questions Mr. Kashkari that you’re working hard. Our question is who you’re working for?” 
(House Oversight Committee, 2008). As stated earlier, in order for government policy to 
effectively address financial crisis concerns, clear accountability and transparency of policies must 
be properly established. The interaction between a politically appointed Treasury official, Mr. 
Kashkari and democratically elected politician Representative Kucinich, reveals the differing 
interests and lack of trust between the two government bodies. 
The issue of trust between Congress and the U.S. Treasury/Federal Reserve was increased 
in 2010 when Bloomberg LP won a court case against the Clearing House Association LLC that 
revealed Federal Reserve bailout efforts totaled to over $7.77 trillion in government assistance. 
Federal Reserve lending programs were announced to the public, but the exact magnitude of 
lending programs was not disclosed until Bloomberg’s successful lawsuit. 
While Congress was debating whether or not to provide additional taxpayer dollars to ailing 
financial institutions, Congressmen had zero knowledge of magnitude of Federal lending 
programs. Former-House Representative member Barney Frank (D-MA) commented, “We were 
aware emergency efforts were going on. We didn’t know the specifics” (Ivry, Keoun and Kuntz 
2011). Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) was also surprised by the numbers and stated, “when you 
see the dollars the banks got, it’s hard to make the case these were successful institutions…There 
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are lawmakers in both parities who would change their votes now” (Ivry, Keoun and Kuntz, 
	  
2011).  Other members in Congress were not as surprised by the Fed’s actions—for example 
Senator Jeb Hensarling, an outspoken critic of the TARP legislation voted against EESA 
explaining that “I was concerned that the program might create a level of moral hazard that could 
create even greater economic turmoil down the road. I fear that many of my fears may actually 
prove well founded.” Nonetheless, the failure of transparency and accountability between the 
Federal Reserve/U.S. Treasury and Congress, allowed the financial sector to access a taxpayer- 
funded bailout. 
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke defended his decision to not disclose spending details, 
claiming that if financial firms were forced to disclose the amount of Federal lending that they 
received, it would create a negative stigma of accessing government funds. Transparency is 
important in mitigating the potential of moral hazard because it creates greater accountability for 
governmental policies. A lack of transparency and revelation of this failure later only worsened 
the accountability of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in the eyes of Congress. 
	  
	  
	  
4.5 Issue in Lending: 
	  
The primary purpose of TARP was to stabilize the economy, but unfortunately for many 
consumers and businesses this stability did not include increased bank lending. In November 
2008 former-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson stated in a CNBC interview “the major purpose 
of the TARP was to stabilize the financial system, first and foremost to prevent a collapse. 
Number two to get lending going. I think that the system has been stabilized” (CNBC 2008). 
Paulson’s statement suggested that the next phase of TARP would be to get the banks to lend 
again. Unfortunately, as Black and Hazelwood (2012) illustrate, the level of lending to 
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consumers and businesses plummeted following the financial crisis. Many financial firms are 
less apt to lend during a financial crisis because of the greater risk that borrowers will default on 
their loans. In addition, as the previous section pointed out, the change in TARP’s 
implementation shifted to a capital injection program without adequate oversight of taxpayer 
funds. Therefore, TARP’s secondary objective was confronted with the financial market’s 
unwillingness to extend lending during the financial crisis. 
In December 2010, Paulson’s successor and now former-Secretary of the Treasury, 
Timothy Geithner testified before the Congressional Oversight Panel to discuss the progress of 
TARP. When the Panel asked about the effectiveness of TARP to spur lending, Secretary 
Geithner responded, “We have authority, still, to continue this set of housing programs to make 
sure they reach as many people as they can. Beyond that, TARP’s contribution will be very 
limited. The principal thing we can do to help small banks manage through this is to make sure 
that we’re doing as much as we can to reopen access for small businesses to credit” (December 
Oversight Report, 2010). Geithner’s statements draw attention to the limited ability that the U.S. 
Treasury had to increase bank lending due to the shifted policy of capitalization. The Panel 
concluded that after 14 months of TARP’s enactment, the availability of credit remained low, 
toxic assets were still on the balance sheets of many large banks, job losses continued, and the 
government’s intervention had signaled to investors the government’s implicit guarantee to major 
financial institutions (December Oversight Report, 2010). The Panel’s conclusions reveal that 
TARP’s change in implementation was not in the best interest. 
On top of the lack of lending that consumers and businesses were receiving, the Treasury 
had paid significantly more for troubled assets due to the complexity of certain financial 
instruments (i.e., MBS) and the lack of developing a proper pricing mechanism. On February 6, 
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2009 the Panel reported that for every $100 spent for 8 healthy banks, the total return was $78, 
resulting in a $22 loss. In the two transactions made for riskier banks, for every $100 the 
Treasury spent, the total return was $41, resulting in a $59 loss (September Oversight Report, 
2009).  Therefore, not only were businesses and consumers suffering from the lack of credit 
available in the marketplace, but many financial firms were able to receive a profit from the 
taxpayer-funded bailout. 
	  
	  
	  
4.6 Presidential Change 
	  
Another interesting facet is the change in political leadership that occurred during the height 
of the great recession in 2009.  In November 2008 Barack Obama won the Presidential ticket, 
representing a shift from a Republican to a Democratic presidency. Obama’s campaign slogan of 
‘change’ created a sense of hope in future governmental policies that would be better aligned 
with the public interest. President-elect Barack Obama spoke at Toledo, Ohio before his election 
and noted that in order to come ahead of the financial crisis “it will take new leadership in 
Washington. It will take a real change in the policies and politics of the last eight years. And 
that’s why I’m running for President of the United States of America.” (Obama, 2008) But 
looking back now five years later, what changes were truly set in place under the Obama 
administration? 
As a democratically elected official, the President relies on public support for (re)election. 
At the time President Obama took office in January 2009, the country’s financial sector was still 
fighting one of its worst financial recessions. Despite the evidence of misaligned regulatory 
policy and corporate ethics, President Obama avoided making serious criticisms of specific 
members in the financial sector. Stiglitz (2010) claims that one reason behind this tactic was to 
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avoid causing conflict in the nation at a time when the country needed unity the most.  While I 
expected the President to be more outspoken about the injustices occurring within the financial 
sector, the overall need for national unity to get through a national crisis can be one justification 
for the lack of criticism. 
Instead of altering economic leadership, the Obama administration kept the same 
individuals who had failed to uphold the public interest. For example, former-head of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Timothy Geithner who was highly involved in the bailout of 
Wall Street financial firms, was appointed as President Obama’s Treasury Secretary. Federal 
Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke was also reappointed by President Obama and commended by 
the President for the efforts he made to stem the financial crisis (Stiglitz, 2010). President Obama 
also appointed Larry Summers as his Chief Economic Advisor (2009-2010), who had served as 
Bill Clinton’s Secretary of the Treasury (1999-2001) and was one of the proponents for the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall (1933).  As a presidential candidate who campaigned on the slogan of 
	  
‘Change’, President Obama failed to uphold his campaign promises, as reflected in the lack of 
change in major leadership positions who had previously failed to keep the public interest in 
mind with their financial policies. 
	  
	  
	  
4.7 Dodd-Frank Act (2010) 
	  
Goal of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) 
	  
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act on July 21, 2010 
with the main goals of providing proper financial regulatory reforms, putting an end to too-big- 
to-fail and preventing another taxpayer-funded bailout (Evanoff and Moeller, 2012; Van Der 
Weide, 2012). In order to properly implement all the stated goals, the 2,319-page Act requires 
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over 250 new regulatory rules. However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not specify how these 
reforms are to be laid out, thereby giving the Federal Reserve and other financial regulators 
significant flexibility in policy implementations. Congress mandated certain deadlines for 
reforms and other studies to be set up by, but due to the complexity and expansiveness of 
legislation, a number of pieces of the Act have yet to be fully executed. The public interest 
appears to be in mind through Congress’ states goals in Dodd-Frank, but the delay of policy 
implementation limits the overall success of legislative reform. 
	  
	  
	  
Dodd-Frank Reforms 
Dodd-Frank was a change in the tide of deregulatory reforms that had been passed for 
decades before the financial crisis. The high amount of speculation preceding the financial crisis, 
illustrated in the leverage ratio of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)12, posed a 
severe risk to financial stability. In accordance to the issue of moral hazard, this study’s results 
illustrate that large banks exhibited moral hazard prior to and during the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. Dodd-Frank addresses the problem of moral hazard by setting up an orderly liquidation 
process for SIFIs headed by the FDIC.  Thus far, the Act requires SIFIs to develop, maintain, and 
periodically submit plans to the FDIC. In terms of proper regulation, the Federal Reserve is 
developing enhanced standards of capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements, along with credit 
limits, stress tests, and remediate framework for bank holding companies and nonbank financial 
firms that the council specifies as SIFIs. As the resolution authority, the FDIC has the power to 
determine which banks, not insured by the institution, pose a systemic threat to the financial 
sector. 
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Dodd-Frank Act defines systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) as bank holding companies that 
have total consolidated assets equal to $50 billion or more (Gruenberg, 2012) 
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In September 2010, the Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the Financial Crisis 
	  
Inquiry Commission and commented on the issue of large banks stating: 
	  
“[T]o-big-to-fail generates a severe moral hazard.  If creditor believe that an institution will not 
be allowed to fail, they will not demand as much compensation for risks as they otherwise would, 
thus weakening market discipline; nor will they invest as many resources in monitoring the 
firm’s risk-taking. As a result, too-big-to-fail firms will tend to take more risk than desirable, in 
the expectation that they will receive assistance if their bets go bad…The buildup of risk in too- 
big-to-fail firms increases the possibility of a financial crisis and worsens the crisis when it 
occurs” (Bernanke, 2010). 
	  
Clearly, from the Chairman’s statements, the Federal Reserve is aware of the increased risk of 
moral hazard that large institutions place on the stability of the financial sector. Given the current 
knowledge, the issue today is developing specific regulatory standards. The FDIC is working to 
set up specific standards that will reduce the probability of the largest banks from defaulting, and 
in the case that an institution does fail, to minimize the risk placed upon the entire financial sector. 
In the case that an SIFI does fail, Dodd-Frank places specific restrictions on the resolution 
process. The management and board of directors who were responsible for the failure of the 
firms must be removed from the organization and equity holders will not receive payment until 
other creditors, including the FDIC, have been paid in full. In addition, the FDIC will not take an 
equity position within the failing firm. In this sense, the Dodd-Frank Act is working to institute 
proper reforms to eliminate the future risk of too-big-to-fail and moral hazard and is in line with 
the public’s interest. 
Issues of Implementation SIFI Reforms 
	  
The regulators in charge of implementing the necessary reforms laid out within the Dodd- 
Frank Act were indebted with one of the largest financial reorganizations to date. However, the 
issue of proper implementation lies in the sheer magnitude of legislation. After almost three 
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years since the Act’s passage, the beginning stages of policy implementation are still being 
hashed out in the Federal Reserve. Regulators are certainly working hard to try to create 
innovative policies in order to properly implement the stated goals of the legislation; but the 
complexity of the Act and the overall financial sector creates a significant challenge in 
developing a clear plan of action for reform. 
Mark Van Der Weide (2012), a senior associate director in the Division of Banking 
Supervision and Regulation at the Fed explains the difficulty in developing a variety of standards 
to properly regulate various SIFI.  Van Der Weide (2012) explains that one of the pressing issues 
is developing a regulatory framework that is proportional to the systemic risk posed by different 
sized-SIFIs. For example, the systemic risk that Zions Bancorp poses on the financial sector 
(with assets under management just above $50 billion) versus financial giants like Citigroup or 
Goldman Sachs is extraordinary. The varying degrees of systemic risk make developing the 
necessary capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements, stress tests, living wills, and remediation 
framework a much more tedious process, thereby limiting the overall success of Dodd Frank’s 
SIFI resolution implementation. 
In addition, many of the same individuals in top financial regulatory roles, who allowed the 
financial sector to take on excessive risk, are in leadership roles of implementing Dodd-Frank 
reform policies. Among these individuals, Ben Bernanke serves and Timothy Geithner13 served 
on the council of Financial Oversight Board (FOB) to implement Dodd-Frank. Chairman 
Bernanke acknowledges his lack of oversight in controlling systemic risks, yet after the fact 
Bernanke holds a main role in determining which banks hold a systemic risk. The irony of this 
	  
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Timothy Geithner served as Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury from January 26th, 2009-January 
25th, 2013. Jacob Lew became the 76th Treasury Secretary on February 28th, 2013. 
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situation is only overshadowed by the threat that our nation’s largest banking issues have yet to 
be resolved. 
	  
	  
	  
4.8 Summary of Analysis 
	  
The Federal Reserve, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Congress, and the President each 
held a significant role in developing proper policies to combat the 2007-2009 financial crisis. I 
hypothesized that democratically elected representatives would enact policies that supported the 
greater public interest, thereby mitigating the risk of moral hazard. However, a number of 
factors prevented Congress from upholding the public interest. First, the preceding years of 
deregulatory legislation passed by Congress allowed the banks to take greater investment risks 
with fewer regulations and adequate consumer protection. Second, the timing of legislation 
during crisis periods, and the time-sensitive nature of security markets are conflicting situations. 
Third, the failure of proper transparency between of the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury to 
	  
Congress and the Presidency limited the effectiveness of policymaking during the crisis. The 
end result of TARP was a good deal for banks to profit from a low cost to borrow from the 
Treasury, but a horrible deal for the American taxpayers. Therefore, the structure of the 
legislative body combined with inadequate transparency from the Federal Reserve and the U.S. 
Treasury, caused the failure of democratically elected bodies to uphold the public interest and 
mitigate the risk of moral hazard during financial crisis. 
In the case of resolution legislation, the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) attempts to mend the 
mistakes from the past by instituting additional regulatory reforms that end too-big-to-fail issues 
and another financial crisis. Unlike the previous TARP legislation, Congress, the U.S. Treasury, 
and the Federal Reserve are working in accordance with one another to increase transparency 
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between the government bodies to ensure the proper implementation for future reforms. 
However, the Act’s extensive agenda limits the speed of policy implementation, thereby failing 
to reduce the systemic risks and upholding the public interest. 
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Chapter Five 
	  
	  
Conclusion 
	  
Summary of Study 
	  
Government policy was an influential factor in the extent to which large banks exhibited 
moral hazard. In analyzing the relative debt-to-equity ratios, large banks displayed moral hazard 
at the onset of the financial crisis through considerable greater risk-taking, compared to medium 
and small banks. However, studies indicate that leverage ratios are procyclical, therefore the 
debt-to-equity ratio can only determine instances of moral hazard during economic booms, but 
during an economic downturn, further risk analysis is needed. Black and Hazelwood (2012) 
provide the additional insight to determine different size bank’s risk-taking during the financial 
crisis. 
Chapter One illustrates the magnitude of government lending facilities and programs 
initiated by the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. At the early stages of the financial crisis, 
the Federal Reserve exhibited an ad-hoc approach to the crisis by setting up lending facilities to 
increase credit lines to depository banks, and eventually to investment banks for financial support. 
The lending facilities provided the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve sent the message to the 
financial sector that the government would assist large banks if they required additional funding 
assistance. 
The expansive amount of government assistance had a varied effect on a bank’s risk-taking 
decision depending (generally) on bank size. In Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) analysis of 
small, medium and large TARP and non-TARP banks, all banks reduced their overall lending of 
C&I loans, but large banks originated higher risk-rated and larger interest rate spreads on new 
loans compared to medium and small banks. Black and Hazelwood (2012) conclude that the 
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lower level of lending combined with higher risk new loan originations is indicative of moral 
hazard. 
I use a similar analytical framework as Black and Hazelwood (2012) by separating banks 
according to size, but also extending the analysis on whether or not the firm received Federal 
lending facilities and/or TARP funds and measuring risk through the debt-to-equity ratio 
between March 2003 until September 2012.  The results indicate that overall, large banks 
operated on a considerably greater debt-to-equity ratio in comparison to medium and small banks 
before the financial crisis. The greater amount of risk, in combination with the large degree of 
losses incurred by the government through bailout efforts, reveals that government policy 
increases the risk of moral hazard on the part of large government-funded banks. In addition, 
today large government-funded banks are still operating on the greatest degree of debt-to-equity 
and therefore still pose a systemic risk to the overall financial sector. 
Chapter Four examined the use of taxpayer dollars to bailout major financial firms and the 
role of democratically elected politicians of Congress and the U.S. President versus politically 
appointed leaders in the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve to mitigate the risk of moral hazard. I 
originally hypothesized that because Congress and the President are subject to a greater degree of 
transparency and accountability, their political decisions would reflect the greater public interest 
while orchestrating legislation during emergency time periods. However, while the legislative 
process is time-consuming (and for good reasons), financial markets are time- sensitive and 
highly responsive. Congressmen may have had the overall public interest in mind 
by enacting TARP, but the structure of the legislative system prevented reforms from effectively 
preventing the risk of moral hazard. The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) attempts to remedy the 
75	  	  
mistakes from the past, but the complexities of the too-big-to-fail banks are creating a slow 
process of implementation due to the necessary legislative innovation and magnitude of reforms. 
	  
	  
	  
Limitations of Study 
	  
Moral hazard is a nebulous concept; therefore, exact measurements of moral hazard 
instances are subject to ambiguity. There are numerous methods to measure a financial firm’s 
relative risk through liquidity ratios, value-at-risk, capital risk, default risk, and return on assets. 
Therefore, there are shortcomings to simply measuring risk by a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. 
In addition, the Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL) only publically discloses 
data based upon bank-size. Black and Hazelwood (2012) were able to gather firm specific data 
from the STBL because of the extended resources that the authors had as a financial analyst at 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and staff economist at the Division of 
International Finance. Therefore, future studies that have access to firm-level data from the 
STBL should add to Black and Hazelwood’s (2012) study by analyzing bank loan-level risk- 
taking ex ante and ex post the authors’ time period of 2007-2010. 
This paper focuses on domestic banks that were affected by the financial crisis, but this was 
a global financial calamity. Therefore, future studies can further explore debt-to-equity ratios in 
other countries that were severely impacted by the crisis. 
	  
	  
	  
Policy Implications 
	  
The issue of too-big-to-fail has not been solved; in fact, the issue is even greater today than 
it was in 2007. Financial instability created an influx of mergers and acquisitions of major 
financial firms that claimed they risked failure if they did not form together. The Dodd-Frank 
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Act (2010) sets out to confront this issue with specific regulatory reforms, but the Federal 
Reserve and underlying bureaus endowed with the power to set in place the reforms, claim to 
still be setting up the framework for a number of regulatory reforms—two years since the 
legislation’s passage. 
The failure of the Federal Reserve to set in place meaningful regulations to limit the future 
risk of too-big-to-fail institutions further signifies that the risk of moral hazard is still with us 
today, similar to what as it was five years ago. As discussed in Chapter 4, many of the financial 
managers of large banks that engaged in excessive leverage are still working for the same firms 
that they managed to near failure. In addition, leaders in the Federal Reserve and the U.S. 
Treasury who allowed financial firms to operate on excessive levels of leverage were reappointed 
to their positions. Representatives in Congress who had voted for years of deregulatory reforms 
in the financial sector were reelected. How is the financial sector expected to bring about real 
reforms if the same individuals are directing the circus? 
The clear-cut solution to this problem, one might argue, is to allow highly leveraged firms to 
fail, therefore discrediting the marketplace’s assumptions. I disagree with this solution, and as we 
saw in the case of Lehman Brothers, allowing one systemically significant institution to fail 
creates a new wave of problems for the government to address. Instead, I believe the proactive 
approach is similar to how former-President Theodore Roosevelt dealt with the railroad 
monopolies in the early 1900s: address the problem head-on, no matter how unpopular the policy 
may be. Our nation needs one leader who is not afraid to challenge the current thought process 
in Congress and in Wall Street. Banks are simply too big and need an orderly resolution to 
downsize. In order for this to occur, individuals must be placed in power who do not have prior- 
vested interests in Wall Street. 
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The current state of our financial sector is going against the market ideologies of 
capitalism. Opponents of market capitalism may point to the 2007-2009 financial crisis was an 
example of the failure of capitalism. I disagree and argue that the financial crisis is an example 
of government policy failing to uphold the principles of capitalism. 
The fact that our government is allowing our financial sector to grow so large, with fewer 
and fewer firms, will put our nation back on the path toward financial ruin. Little bumps along 
the road with boom and bust cycles are normal. But the economic calamity that struck the global 
economy from December 2007-June 2009 was no normal downturn. Our government has the 
power to enact real legislative reforms to change the tide of too big to fail and the future risk of 
moral hazard. The question is, who will be willing to stand up to the financial giant that we 
created? 
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Appendices 
	  
	  
	  
Appendix A STBL Loan Risk Ratings 
Loan Risk Description 
Minimal Risk = 1 Loans have a ‘virtually no chance’ of loss because the borrower has been 
with the institution for a number of years, has a solid credit history 
sufficient cash flow, high quality management with ‘unquestionable 
character’, a debt rating of AA or higher, a number of alternative finance 
sources, and the collateral is equal or higher than the value of the loan. 
(Guarantor would receive this rating if borrowing from institution) 
Low risk = 2 Loans are ‘very unlikely’ to result in a loss because the borrower has an 
excellent credit history, sufficient cash flow, a BBB or higher public debt 
rating, high quality management with ‘unquestionable character’, good 
access to alternatives sources to finance, and collateral likely to recover 
full amount of the loan if default occurred. (Guarantor would receive this 
rating if borrowing from inst.) 
Moderate risk = 3 Loans have ‘little chance’ of resulting in a loss because the borrower has a 
‘good’ credit history, a cash flow that is subject to cyclical conditions, 
limited access to capital markets, a limited amount of alternative resources, 
good management in important conditions, and collateral likely to recover 
the full amount of the loan if default occurred. (Guarantor would receive 
this rating if borrowing from inst.) 
Acceptable risk = 4 Acceptable risk = 4: Loans have a ‘limited chance’ of resulting in a loss 
because the borrower has a ‘fair’ credit history without any recent 
problems, adequate cash flow to meet debt repayments, but may not be 
enough to meet significant debt financing activities, no access to capital 
markets, limited access to alternative resources, presence of weak 
management, sufficient collateral, but may be difficult to liquidate. 
(Guarantor would receive this rating if borrowing from inst.) 
Special Mention = 5 Examination category as “substandard”, “doubtful”, or “loss”. Generally 
workout loans. 
Source: Survey of Terms of Business Lending 
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Appendix B Chronology of TARP 
Date Event 
09/20/08 US Treasury submits draft legislation for Congress to authorize the purchase of 
troubled assets 
09/29/08 HR rejects legislation requesting the purchase of troubled assets from financial 
institutions 
10/03/08 Congress passes/Bush signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008-- $700 billion TARP 
10/14/08 Treasury announced TARP will purchase equity in financial institutions through 
$250 billion of capital; 9 large financial organizations announce their intention to 
subscribe for $125 billion 
10/28/08 Treasury purchases $125 billion in preferred stock under the Capital Purchase 
Program (CPP): [$204.7 billion] 
11/10/08 American International Group (AIG): [$69.8 billion]: Purchase of preferred 
stocks in AIG and reduce the Fed’s loan from $85 billion to $60 billion 
11/12/08 Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson announced that the Treasury will no longer 
purchase illiquid mortgage-rated assets from financial institutions 
11/14/08 Treasury purchases $33.5 billion in preferred stock in 21 banks under CPP 
11/18/08 Executives of Ford, GM, & Chrysler testify before Congress requesting for access 
to TARP funds 
11/21/08 Treasury purchases $3 billion in preferred stock in 23 banks under CPP 
11/23/08 Treasury along with Fed and FDIC announce agreement with Citigroup to 
provide guarantees, liquidity access and capital; -$306 billion from FDIC; Fed 
non-recourse loan; Treasury provide $20 billion 
12/05/08 Treasury purchases $4 billion in preferred stock under CPP 
12/12/08 Treasury purchases $6.25 billion in preferred stock under CPP 
12/19/08 Treasury authorizes $13.4 billion for GM and $4 billion for Chrysler from TARP 
12/23/08 Treasury purchase $15.1 billion in preferred stock under CPP 
12/29/08 Treasury purchases $5 billion in equity from GMAC to assist auto industry; 
agrees to lend up to $1 billion to GM 
12/31/08 Treasury purchases $1.91 billion in preferred stock under CPP 
01/09/09 Treasury purchases $4.8 billion in preferred stock under CPP 
01/16/09 Treasury purchases $1.4 billion in preferred stock from 39 US banks 
01/16/09 Finalized agreement with Treasury, Fed and FDIC of their guarantee agreement 
with Citigroup 
01/23/09 Treasury purchases $326 million in preferred stock under CPP 
01/30/09 Treasury purchases $1.15 billion in preferred stock 
02/10/09 Treasury creation of the Public-Private Investment Fund to acquire troubled-loans 
and other assets from financial institutions 
02/13/09 Treasury purchases $429 million in preferred stock under CPP 
02/24/09 Treasury purchases $365.4 million in preferred stock under CPP 
02/25/09 Fed, FDIC, and Comptroller of the Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision 
announce plans for ‘stress tests’ for banks 
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02/27/09 US Treasury announment that its willing to convert $25 billion of Citigroup 
preferred stock under CPP into common equity 
03/06/09 Treasury purchases $284.7 million in preferred stock under CPP 
03/13/09 Treasury purchases $1.45 billion in preferred stock under CPP 
03/19/09 Auto Suppliers Support Program: [$3.5 billion] TARP funds supplied to GM 
Supplier Receivables, Chrysler Receivables 
03/20/09 Treasury purchases $80.8 million in preferred stock under CPP 
03/25/09 US Treasury proposes legislation that would grant the US government the 
authority to put certain financial institutions into conservatorship or receivership 
to reduce systemic risked from the potential insolvency of a significant financial 
firm 
03/27/09 Treasury purchase $193 million in preferred stock under CPP 
04/03/09 Treasury purchases $54.8 million in preferred shares under CPP 
04/10/09 The U.S. Treasury purchases a total of $22.8 million in preferred stock from 5 
U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program 
04/17/09 The U.S. Treasury purchases a total of $40.9 million in preferred stock from 6 
U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
	  
Source:  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy Actions” 
